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Abstract 
This dissertation examines how educational policy reforms are carried out through the initia-
tiYe process. First. I de\'elop a model of consensus-making among members of a group when 
members may care about each other"s policies. The immediate application of this model 
is to the initiati\"e process "when multiple districts implement the new policies. From the 
theoretical model, I find that discretion can play an important role in the initiatiye process: 
discretion \vill be incorporated into the proposal of the initiatiye group when voters haw 
heterogeneous preferences across districts or when local agents of implementation are bet-
ter informed. Next, I study how voters vote on educational measures and then how school 
districts implement them. I find that, when looking at educational measures in California 
in the last thirty years, voting on them is not particularly different from voting on other 
measures. or voting in general, in terms of turnout or voter behayior. Examining voter be-
havior on Proposition 227 on dismantling bilingual education in California, I find that local 
school conditions did not seem to have a strong impact on voter support for the measure. 
Examining school districts' compliance to Proposition 227 I find that voter support for the 
measure did not have a strong impact on districts' compliance. Finally, I end the dissertation 
with a careful examination of the impact of Proposition 227 on those directly affected by it: 
bilingual students in a California school district. I find that this educational reform had a 
positive impact on students previously enrolled in bilingual programs though the effect was 
small. Educational initiatives are shaped (and sometimes diluted) by local attributes both 
at the stages of proposal-making and implementation. 
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Chapter 1 Introd uction 
~Whether the initiative process benefits or hurts democracy has been a long-standing debate 
within political science. Those who consider the benefits of direct democracy often see the 
initiative process as invigorating the democratic system. Initiatives add a new venue for 
citizens to impact policy, they influence legislators to respond to citizens' concerns, and in 
general they heighten civic participation of citizens. On the other hand, those who stress the 
negative aspects of initiatives are often concerned with the undue influence of moneyed groups 
or the possibility that an ill-informed majority might make poor public policy decisions. In 
this dissertation, I examine, formally and empirically, the initiative process when a reform 
is attempted of locally implemented policies. State-wide initiatives are state laws voted by 
citizens. But in the policy realm, for example, in education, welfare or criminal justice, 
policies are often carried out at the local level, reflecting previous state-wide regulations or 
reflecting local preferences. In this environment, how do local preferences and attributes 
impact policy reforms adopted by the initiative process? To begin to address this question I 
develop a formal model of the initiative process with local implementation, and empirically 
analyze one policy area: educational initiatives in California. 
To accomplish the task of assessing the initiative process and local policy reform, I 
organize the dissertation into four main chapters. Chapter 2 presents a formal model of 
consensus-making by members of a group who may care about the policies being implemented 
in other members' constituencies. The immediate application of this model is to the initiative 
process when multiple districts are present and a majority of votes are needed. The focus 
is on the impact of districts' preferences and attributes on the initiatives that are proposed 
and on the welfare of all districts. I find that if voters have heterogeneous preferences across 
districts, or if local bureaucracies are better informed, then proposals with discretion are 
more likely to be offered. That is, local districts will be given some leeway in terms of 
the proposals they can implement. The formal model also makes clear the importance of 
the types of proposals allowed. Universal proposals or the same proposal to all districts is 
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under many circumstances preferred by voters than having specific proposals tailored for 
each district. These results show how the initiative process, though hardly ever improving 
the welfare of all districts, must accommodate local preferences. 
In chapter 3, I explore empirically how voters vote on educational measures. Education 
is an ideal policy realm to examine policy reforms through the initiative process when local 
preferences matter. American educational institutions tend to be quite decentralized and 
local preferences can have a strong impact on policies. Educational initiatives have become 
increasingly common across the states with direct democracy, partly as a response to an 
increased concern (and frustration) with educational outcomes. How do citizens vote on a 
policy area which they may experience closely from interacting with local schools, and on 
which they may display very different preferences across districts? Looking at California's 
educational measures in the last thirty years I find that there is no systematic difference in 
terms of how voters vote or turnout in educational initiatives versus other types of initiatives. 
There is some evidence that race plays a role when voting on educational matters, but 
local school conditions seem to have a small impact, after controlling for ideological and 
socioeconomic factors. 
After examining how voters vote on educational matters, I explore how school districts 
implement these measures. In chapter 4, I focus on the implementation of Proposition 227, 
an educational initiative in 1998 that aimed to dismantle bilingual programs throughout 
California's public schools. Proposition 227 is an example of an educational initiative in 
which discretion was allowed: parents could request waivers for their children to remain in 
bilingual classes at the discretion of district authorities. Proposition 227 is a good case study 
since this initiative addressed local preferences by allowing for discretion, it required for local 
implementation, it applied to the whole state of California (over 1000 school districts), and 
finally it addressed a long-lasting debate on the efficacy of bilingual instruction. Looking at 
the enrollment of English learners in bilingual classes in 1998, before the reform, and in 1999, 
after the reform, I find that bureaucratic and institutional-related factors played a strong role 
in predicting the level of compliance by school districts to the initiative's mandate. Factors 
such as size, location and the race of the school principal had a strong impact on compliance. 
But local voter support for Proposition 227 and students' performance had a small impact 
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on compliance. 
In the last chapter of the dissertation, I specifically evaluate the impact of Proposition 
227. As previously discussed, this initiative aimed to dismantle bilingual programs in Cal-
ifornia's public schools. The efficacy of bilingual education has been controversial, both in 
the academic literature and public opinion. Proposition 227 was far from being interpreted 
as simply another school reform, but, rather political undertones, often detrimental to mi-
norities, were ascribed to this initiativ(~ as well. I focus my study on one school district in 
southern California that essentially dismantled its bilingual program after Proposition 227. 
After one year of the reform, I find that English learners previously enrolled in bilingual 
classes caught up \vith other English learners who had not been in bilingual classes that 
year, and who in general were more proficient in English. The impact of the reform though 
is small. 
Understanding how policy reforms are proposed and carried out through the initiative 
process is critical since initiatives have increasingly become a common tool for policy reform. 
The initiative process skips law-making via state legislatures and allows citizen or interest 
group to propose and make policy. This process of policy-making can become even more 
decentralized when local jurisdictions can playa role in the final implementation, as is often 
the case in education. Understanding what the proper locus is for policy-making, centralized 
or decentralized, is an important debate in political science. In this dissertation, I attempt 
to examine the impact of local preferences and attributes on the initiative process when 
reforming policies in the realm of education. I find that, on the one hand, proposers do 
have to take into consideration the degree of dispersion of local preferences and the level 
of information at the local level. In many cases, this will induce the proposers to offer 
policies with discretion. On the other hand, school districts that implement these reforms 
may not necessarily respond to local voter support to an educational measure while voters 
do not seem to respond to local school conditions when voting on that measure. Those who 
propose educational reforms through the initiative process may anticipate local preferences 
but those who implement them may also ignore those local preferences. 
4 
Chapter 2 Consensus-Making and Discretion: An 
Application to the Initiative Process 
Summary 
In this chapter I develop a model of proposal-making among members of a group who may care 
about the policies being implemented ill each member's constituency. The immediate application 
is to the initiative process, when a citizen group makes a proposal that is voted on at the state level 
but implemented at the local level by bureaucratic agencies in each district. The key finding of this 
model is that the proposer will not always propose a unique policy. Discretion will be provided when 
members of the group (or voters) have heterogeneous preferences or when the agents responsible 
for the implementation are better informed. 
2.1 Introduction 
In many occasions initiatives proposed by citizen groups or legislators require local agencies 
to carry out the new proposed law. A recent example is Proposition 227 in California which 
passed in 1998 and aimed to dismantle bilingual programs throughout the state. Proposition 
227 was passed at the state level but implemented mostly at the school district level or in 
some cases at the school level. Another example in California is Proposition 187, which 
passed in 1994 and barred illegal immigrants from accessing public services. These state-
wide initiatives elicit the preferences of the majority of voting citizens. However, at the 
implementation stage local preferences playa substantial role. Local agencies carry out 
implementation, while taking into consideration their own preferences and those of their 
districts. Clearly, a conflict can arise between state-wide majoritarian preferences and local 
preferences. How the proposing group takes into account this potential tension when making 
proposals and the ulterior impact on the welfare of the districts is the subject of this study. 
In this chapter I model the impact of local attributes and preferences on the proposal and 
implementation of initiatives when the implementation takes place at the local level. \Nhat 
5 
distinguishes this problem from that of initiatives implemented at the state-level by a central 
agency is that more than one district exists, and in each district a local agency will implement 
the new policy, replacing pre-existing local policy status quo. Moreover, externalities will 
be present: the initiative group cares about policies across districts (otherwise it would not 
invest in a costly state-wide proposal), and voters may care about policies in other districts 
as well. The presence of numerous districts, agents, and externalities add new elements to 
the one-district models analyzed in the initiative literature (Gerber 1996, 1999; Matsusaka 
and McCarty 1998). For example, with multiple districts proposing the same policy to all 
districts, as predicted in single-district models, may not be optimal. Offering instead an 
interval of policies may be the optimal proposal. 
I focus the present study of initiatives with local implementation on three main questions. 
First, I look at the impact of local districts' preferences on the proposals made by initiative 
groups in multi-district environments, and how these proposals differ from those made in 
single-district models. Second, I analyze the impact of different rules on proposal-making on 
the welfare of the initiative group and the districts. And finally, I assess how local initiatives 
raise voter welfare compared to the status quo and providing full discretion. To answer these 
questions I develop a simple voting model with one initiative group and multiple districts. 
Voters in each district vote on the proposed policies by the initiative group while the local 
agent of implementation, also a voter, enacts a policy from the proposed set. In the present 
analysis I do not include the legislature (Boehmke 2000; Gerber 1996) nor the courts, but 
rather focus on the impact of externalities: at first only experienced by the proposing group, 
later on, experienced by voters as well. 
In a multi-district model, the array of proposals is richer than in the single-strict case 
that has been previously analyzed in the literature. With multiple districts, if the initiative 
group can propose policies that vary by district it will "tailor" offers to each district. Only 
under restrictive conditions will the initiative group propose a single policy for all districts, 
as in single-district models. Furthermore, if the proposals must be the same for all districts, 
then intervals of policies or a certain level of discretion may be offered. In particular, when 
districts have ideal policies that are very far from those of the proposing group, the group 
may offer intervals of policies to obtain a majority of votes. But discretion can also be 
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offered at the opposite end, when districts have ideal policies that are very close to those of 
the group and local agents are better informed than the proposing group. The asymmetry of 
information between the proposer and the districts can induce the proposing group to offer 
discretion when their preferences are aligned. 
In a multi-district setting the rules of proposal-making matter. Whether proposals vary 
by district or they are the same for all districts is relevant to the welfare of the proposing 
group and the voters. The initiative group will always prefer to propose district-specific 
proposals rather than making the same proposal to all districts. Voters, on the other hand, 
are better off when the same proposal is offered to them under not too strong conditions. 
The intuition is that the initiative group provides more opportunity for improvement in voter 
welfare when intervals of policies are offered rather than proposing a few selected policies to 
each district. 
In terms of voter welfare, initiatives with local implementation maximize the welfare of 
districts under restrictive conditions. Although districts that belong to the winning coalition 
must be offered policies that they support as much as their local current policies, districts 
outside the winning coalition may be offered quite worse policies than those they are cur-
rently experiencing and voter welfare may decline. If the comparison is made to the case 
of full discretion, when districts can introduce any policy they wish, the initiative process, 
clearly, never does better than full discretion. However, once externalities across districts 
are introduced, the initiative process can improve social welfare compared to full discretion. 
Finally, in a multi-district environment the initiative group has an incentive to claim 
externalities are present across districts, for example, when districts have policy preferences 
on each side of the initiative group and the group has a mediating position. Districts will have 
an incentive to obtain more information to develop an asymmetry of information between 
them and the proposing group, in particular when their preferences are aligned with those of 
the group. But, in general, districts will not have an incentive to claim there is asymmetry 
of information. 
Overall, the present results are applicable to a broader class of problems in which a ma-
jority consensus is sought among constituents of a group (for example, members of Congress 
or an international body government). In these problems, a member of a group, who may 
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care about enacted policies in others constituencies, endogenously decides to make a proposal 
that will affect all members of the group. 
In the next sections I situate the present work in the literature and describe the model's 
assumptions. Then I introduce the results for the basic model on proposal-making, institu-
tional rules and welfare. The remaining sections extend the basic model to the cases with 
asymmetric information and externalities, while the last section discusses testable hypotheses 
and the application of the model to broader problems. 
2.2 Initiatives and Consensus 
The focus of the present study has links to three strands of literature. First, it is part of a 
formal modeling literature in political science on the initiative process, where the common 
assumption is to consider the electorate as one single district, with a single status quo, and 
analyze proposal-making with one or multiple initiative groups given costs of proposal, the 
presence of the legislature, and other agencies of constraint (Gerber 1996, 1999; Gerber and 
Lupia 1995). The results of this earlier work (mostly set forth by Gerber (1996)) concludes 
that the initiative process induces policies more in line with voters' preferences compared 
to policy-making through state legislatures. Subsequent work has qualified the benefits to 
the median voter when uncertainty is introduced, or costs of proposal are high (Boehmke 
2000; Matsusuka and McCarty 1998). In recent work, Gerber, Lupia, McCubbins, and 
Kiewiet (2000) analyze the implementation of initiatives in a single district model. In their 
"vertical" model initiatives face obstacles from government actors such as the governor and 
the legislature who can impede full compliance if they are opposed to the measure. That is, 
intervening political players can boycott an initiative after its passage. 
The present work differs from the previous literature in that, firstly, multiple districts are 
present already implementing their local policies. The multiplicity of districts implies that 
voters will assess proposals with respect to their local status-quo (which the proposer must 
take into consideration) and voter welfare assessments will depend upon the sizes of districts 
and not simply on the identity of the median voter. Compared to Gerber, Lupia, McCubbins, 
and Kiewiet's analysis my model emphasizes the "horizontal" obstacles of proposing and 
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implementing an initiative (multiple districts) rather than the "vertical" ones (governor and 
legislature). Moreover, I endogenously derive the offer of policy discretion which plays a 
central role in explaining why policies may be diluted already at the proposing stage, before 
the implementation. Gerber et al., do not address discretion while any observed ambiguities 
in the policies are exogenously posited. 1 If to the multiplicity of districts we add agencies 
of implementation combined with the presence of externalities across districts, the present 
problem becomes quite distinct from those previously studied in the initiative literature. 
The chapter's focus is also related to questions of federalism and centralization of political 
jurisdictions which constitute a large literature both in political science and economics. 
Recent political science studies on federalism have addressed the benefits of devolving a 
variety of policy-making and regulatory powers from the federal government to the states 
(Ferejohn and Weingast 1997). The emphasis is on welfare and the decentralization of 
political power. In political economy, some of the issues addressed have been optimal sizes 
of jurisdictions in a federation (Gilbert and Picard 1995), and federal voting mechanisms 
(Piketty 1996; Cremer and Palfrey 1996, 1999). What distinguishes this line of research 
is that in general some optimal output (size, voting mechanism) is sought given multiple 
districts that may join in a bigger unit. In the present work, districts cannot secede and the 
voting mechanism is fixed. A large focus of this chapter is on the impact of local attributes 
and preferences on policies passed via the initiative process. The comparison is made to full 
discretion, when districts can choose their own policies. This makes the analysis closer to 
welfare studies that assess centralized versus decentralized policy-making. 
The final strand of literature is concerned with decision-making and delegation in legis-
latures. Legislative studies have included models of proposal-making (Shepsle and Weingast 
1981; Baron and Ferejohn 1989) where often the focus is distributive, analyzing the resulting 
division of the pie when a proposer attempts to enlist a majority of legislators. An important 
difference between those models and the present one is that the proposer and the districts 
may care about policies across districts. That is, externalities are present, stressing the 
public goods component of the analysis, rather than a distributive private goods one. Fur-
1 Note that both approaches, "vertical" or "horizontal" are complimentary, focusing on different aspects 
of implementation. 
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thermore, local policies are being carried out by local agencies, which brings us to legislative 
bureaucratic models of delegation, another topic in legislative studies. Work in this area 
(Epstein and O'Halloran 1994, 1999; Gailmard 2000) suggests that legislators will delegate 
and provide discretion when agencies are more knowledgeable. Similar results apply in the 
initiative context. But, as shown in the next sections, discretion can also arise due to voters' 
heterogeneous preferences. 
2.3 The Basic Model 
There are N districts indexed by i. The relative size of a district is Wi such that "Li Wi = 1. 
Citizens care about policy on a single dimensional space represented by R The policy vector 
x = (Xl, ... , Xn) represents the policies implemented in each district i by an agent of imple-
mentation, also a voter of the district. For example, consider Proposition 227 on bilingual 
education; different values of X may correspond to different levels of allowed Spanish-speaking 
in school districts. In the basic model, a voter in district i cares only about the policy, Xi, 
in his or her district. The voters' preferences are represented by the single-peaked utility 
function U(Xi; v) where cu is the voter's ideal policy. Single-peakedness is the only assump-
tion needed to obtain the results in this chapter. An example of a single-peaked utility 
specification is U(Xi; v) = -(Xi - V)2. 
Before an initiative is proposed, the policy status quo in each district is Si. The set of 
points that are weakly preferred to Si by the voters of district i will be denoted Pi. S; will 
refer to the closest point to the group's ideal point from the set Pi. The initiative group's 
ideal point is I, and in an abuse of notation, I will also refer to the initiative group itself. 
The group derives utility from the policies enacted in each district, with each term consisting 
of a single-peaked function U(.Xi; 1) weighed by a district's size Wi. 2 
Figure 1 shows two districts with their respective ideal points and the ideal point, I, of 
the initiative group. Also included is the utility function of district 1 and the point S;, the 
point in district l's preferred set that is closest to I. District 2's preferred set P 2 goes from 
2The group could also experience a cost c for making a proposal such that U(x, I) = I:i -Wi1L(Xi; I) - c. 
But, for most of the analysis, the cost term will be ignored, that is c = 0, so as to focus on the proposal-making 
activities of the group. 
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52 to 5~. 
[Figure 1 about here]. 
The assumptions of the benchmark model are the following: 
AI. Homogeneous Preferences: All voters in a district have the same ideal point Vi. 
A2. Complete Information: The number of districts N, their relative sizes Wi, the 
ideal points Vi and I, and the status quos 5 i are known by voters and the group. 
A3. Number of initiative groups: There is one initiative group making proposals. 
A4. Externalities: The initiative group cares about policies across districts. Voters do 
not care about policies in other districts. 
A5. Asymmetric Information: The agents of implementation, who are voters, have 
no extra information compared to the initiative group or other voters. 
A6. Voter Welfare: Voters' welfare will be defined as the weighted sum of the utilities 
of each district. The weights are given by the districts' relative size, 
In the case of quadratic utility functions, W(x, V) = L:i -Wi (Xi - Vi)2. Note that voter 
welfare does not include the utility of the initiative group. 
Assumption Al is made to simplify the presentation. If voters preferences in a district 
vary, then the district's median policy will not suffice to analyze the model. The proposer 
may not need to get half of the votes in a district but fewer votes may do. In that event, 
other parameters describing the distribution of preferences in a district are needed to analyze 
the model. Relaxing Al should not change the general qualitative results presented here. 
Assumptions A3 and A4, combined with the definition of the utility functions of the group 
and the voters, have several possible interpretations. On the one hand, the initiative group 
may be interpreted as representing the interests of like-minded minority voters in each dis-
trict. The group then cares about policies across districts because its membership extends 
across them. An alternative interpretation is that the proposer belongs to one of the districts 
(though it may have different preferences from those in the district) and its preferences are 
lexicographic, caring first for the policies in its own district and then about policies in other 
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districts. In either interpretation, voters in the benchmark model do not care about policies 
in other districts. 
After analyzing the benchmark model I relax some of its assumptions. In particular, I 
consider a model in which local agents of implementation are better informed than voters or 
the initiative group, relaxing assumption A5. Then, I consider a model in which voters care 
about policies in other districts, relaxing assumption A4. 
The Game 
The initiative group proposes a policy vector P = (PI, ... ,PN) and a level of discretion 
vector d = (d l , ... , dN ) such that, if implemented, policies must fall in P ± d. When a majority 
of voters approves (p, d), in each district i the agent of implementation, who is a voter and 
by assumption Al has the same preferences as all voters in the district, chooses the optimal 
policy Xi within the district's allowed interval. 3 The game will be solved by backwards 
induction and the solution concept used will be subgame perfect equilibria. 
I further make the following behavioral voting assumptions. If a district has its status 
quo, Si, equal to its ideal point Vi, then it will not vote for any initiative since it is already 
satisfied. If a voter is offered a policy within Pi he or she will vote for it (with the exception 
of Vi). Districts' status quo may not coincide with their ideal policy point, or Si I- Vi if local 
preferences have changed, the agents of implementation have the discretion to implement 
different policies from local preferences, or there is uncertainty at the time of implementing 
new policies. 
Terminology 
When the policy vector P and d consist of the same policies offered to all districts, that 
is, Pi = Pj and di = dj for all i and j, I will refer to such proposals as belonging to a universal 
regime. If the proposed policies can vary by district, that is Pi I- Pj for some i and j, I will 
refer to such proposals as belonging to a district-specific regime. If a the proposal has no 
discretion and is the same for all districts, or Pi = Pj and di = 0 for all i, I will refer to it as a 
single proposal. Single proposals may occur both in universal or district-specific regimes. I 
3 Assuming the agent has the same preferences as those of the district is a first approximation to the 
problem, and future research should relax this assumption. The assumption represents districts where, for 
example, agents are elective officials with a high degree of accountability. 
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also define a majority coalition lU as a set of districts with LicM Wi > ~ in which no district 
can be removed without foregoing passage. 
When proposals are universal I assume the group makes an interval offer of policies rather 
than offering multiple single policies. These two assumptions are mostly equivalent except 
for a few cases in which the group would have been better off by offering multiple policies. 
The analysis with intervals is more succinct in terms of presentation and may correspond 
better to real world applications. 
2.4 Results for the Basic Model 
In the basic model all voters in a district have the same preferences, the local agent in a 
district is a voter with no special information, and there are no externalities across districts. 
The group, whose preferences depend on the policies implemented by each district, will make 
a proposal that maximizes its utility subject to the constraint that a majority of voters passes 
it. But what proposals does the group make? vVill it offer an interval from which all districts 
have to pick, or will it propose individual policies to each district? We might suspect that the 
group is better off when it offers individual policies to each district, and indeed that is the 
case. District-specific proposals may entail a proposal that varies predictably according to 
a characteristic of the districts, or it may be an arbitrary specification. 4 The latter proposal 
may be subject to legal constraints, and in general higher costs of passage. 
Presently, I abstract from considerations of costs and legal issues that would give rise to 
endogenous choices by the group regarding the type of proposal (universal or district-specific) 
it would make. Instead, I assume district-specific and universal proposals are institutional 
rules, exogenously given. In the following sections I contrast the proposals made in each 
regime, as well as the consequences of each rule for the group and the districts' welfare. 5 
4 A recent example of an initiative that varied by a district's characteristics is Michigan's Proposition 1 
on education vouchers in the 2000 general elections. This initiative allowed vouchers only in school districts 
that had graduation rates of less than 2/3 of each class. In contrast California's voucher measure applied to 
all students. Both measures were defeated. 
'''Test 
13 
2.4.1 Policies Proposed by the Initiative Group 
In the maximization problem faced by the initiative group the only relevant parameters are 
the districts' ideal policy, Vi, the district sizes, Wi, the status quo, Si, and the initiative 
group's ideal point I. Given that the game being solved is one of complete information, the 
group can perfectly predict how voters will vote, how districts will respond and therefore 
backward induct the optimal proposal it should make. Regardless of the institutional rules 
on district-specific versus universal proposals, the initiative group cannot make any group 
with a share larger than ~ worse-off since it needs a majority of votes. If Wj > ~ then Pj 
±dj , the proposal to district j, must intersect Pj , district j's preferred set of policies. 
District-Specific Proposals 
In a district-specific regime the initiative group can choose policies for each district in 
such a way as to maximize its utility subject to the constraint that the proposals obtain a 
majority of votes. If the districts are already at their ideal points, or Si = Vi, the initiative 
group cannot benefit from proposing an initiative since all offers will be rejected, given 
the assumptions made on voters' behavior. Clearly, the more interesting situations arise 
when districts do not have status quos equal to their ideal points, due to changes in local 
preferences or agents implementing policies under some uncertainty. 
For the subsequent analysis I assume there exists at least one majority coalition of dis-
tricts that are not already at their ideal points. Furthermore, I make the following definitions: 
"dominant district" corresponds to when Wi > ~ for some i; "equal-power-among-
districts" corresponds to when a fixed number d of districts is necessary and sufficient to 
form a majority coalition !vI; "mixed districts" when districts are neither dominant nor 
have equal power; and "aligned districts" when all districts have ideal points to one side 
of I. With these definitions and assumptions, Proposition 1 describes the optimal proposal 
in a district-specific regime. 
Proposition 1 Given a district-spec~fic regime, the group's optimal offer is: Dominant 
district case) The group offers S; to the dominant district i and I to j # 'i; Equal-power-
among-districts case) The group ranks the districts by their weighted value WiU(S;; 1) and 
offers to the first smallest d districts their S; s while to the remaining districts it offers I; 
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Mixed districts case) The group ranks the utility provided by each majority coalition 1111 zm-
plementing their 5; s while the remaining districts implement I. The gro'u,p picks the proposal 
that provides the ma.rimum utility.6 Proof: See Appendix. 
In a district-specific regime the initiative group offers to a majority coalition their policies 
5; while to all remaining districts it offers I. For example, if there are two districts, one liberal 
and the other conservative, where the conservative district is dominant then the group offers 
to the conservative district the policy S~, while to the liberal district it offers I. If a centrist 
district now is added such that N = 3, and there is equal-power-among-districts, then 
any two districts can form a majority coalition. The group ranks the three districts by their 
weighted utility to the group and offers to the first two districts their 5; and to the remaining 
district it offers I. 
Districts offered policies in their preferred sets may not necessarily be those with Sis 
closest to I. For example, consider Figure 2, with district weights WI = 0.4, W2 = 0.4, W3 = 
0.2 and policy points S~ = -1,5; = 0.25 and 5; = 1.25. The group offers policies in the 
preferred sets of districts 2 and 3, even though 3's preferred set is farther out than l's. The 
group values policies close to its ideal point but it also cares about the size of the district 
implementing that policy. If all districts are of equal size, clearly, closeness is the deciding 
criteria. 
[Figure 2 about here]. 
The ability to offer its own ideal policy to districts not included in the majority coalition 
suggests that offering a single policy will occur under restrictive conditions. In fact, single 
policies are offered only when a majority of districts have preferences aligned with those of 
the initiative group. 
Proposition 2 Assume N > 1. Given a district-specific regime, a single policy is offered, if 
and only if, I belongs to the preferred set of a majority coalition M. Proof: See Appendix. 
Universal Proposals 
Consider the case now when the initiative group proposes the same policy to all districts, 
6 The mixed case is a "brute force" check of all proposals so as to pick the optimal one. A more efficient 
algorithm was not immediate. 
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or Pi = Pj , di = dj for all i and j. The initiative group may choose to offer a single policy 
to all districts or the same interval for all districts. As mentioned earlier, I will analyze 
intervals rather than offers consisting of multiple points. 7 
The intuition for introducing discretion is to obtain the necessary votes from districts 
that have relatively different preferences from the initiative group. In general, the proposals 
under a universal regime will consist either of single policies, or intervals of policies of the 
following form: [I, S; ], [Vi, S; ], or [S; ,S; ].8 
Proposition 3 Given a universal regime, the group's optimal offer is: Dominant district 
case) The group offers [St, I] or S;; Aligned distr'icts case) The group offers an interval 
covering the S; s (or Vis) of the M districts with closest preferred sets to form a majority 
coalition; All other cases 3) The group ranks the utility provided by each majority coalition 
M that are offered intervals covering their S;s (or Vis). The group picks the proposal that 
provides the maximum utility. Proof: See Appendix. 
For example, if there are two districts and the conservative district is dominant, then the 
group offers Se if its preferences are even more conservative than those of the conservative 
group. The group may offer the interval [I, Se] if it prefers a mediating policy between 
the liberal and the conservative group. If N = 3 and districts have equal-power-among 
them then more opportunities arise for discretion to be provided. In a universal regime, as 
seen next in Proposition 4, single policies are offered under strong conditions and discretion 
prevails. 
Proposition 4 In a universal regime, with N> 1, discretion is always offered except when: 
1) I belongs to the preferTed set of a majority coalition M of districts and I is proposed; or 
2) Districts are aligned and ther'e is an S; belonging to a majority coalition M with no ideal 
point V between it and I. Si* is then offered. Proof: See Appendix. 
7 A universal policy p ± d is equivalent to the offer of each one of the points the districts will eventually 
choose, under most circumstances, though not all. For example, when the group offers an interval [Vi, Sj], 
it might have been better off offering S;' and Sj. 
SIntervals of the form [1, Vi] will not be optimal since, either 1 belongs to Pi in which case 1 alone can 
be offered, or 1 does not belong Pi, in which case proposing S;' is more beneficial. 
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In general, discretion is always offered except for the degenerate cases when a majority 
of districts prefers the group's ideal policy or the districts' preferences are all to one side of 
the group and a single mediating policy results. If preferences are disperse, or N > 2, no 
district is dominant, and the intersection of any Pi sets is empty, then discretion must be 
offered since at least two districts are needed to obtain a majority and no two districts have 
any preferred policies in common. Figure 3 shows two examples: in the top, a single policy 
s~ is offered. In the bottom, as preferences become more heterogeneous the interval [s~, s;] 
is offered (or taking into consideration 1 's actions [Vi, s;]). 
[Figure 3 about here]. 
When there is only one status quo the group still has an incentive to offer intervals of 
policies, in particular when districts outside the winning majority coalition have ideal points 
close to the group's. However, if the number of districts is reduced the need to spread out 
the proposals decreases. In fact, when there is only one district the proposals are always a 
single policy. The single-policy proposal is the common result in previous initiative models 
that have restricted the analysis to single districts. 
In the previous section I pointed out to the fact that under a district-specific regIme 
the districts with policies in their preferred sets which are closest to I are not necessarily 
proposed. Under a universal regime similar examples can be constructed. 
Comparisons between District Specific and Universal Proposals 
When comparing the proposals made under district-specific and universal regimes, one 
may expect very little overlap of proposals between them given that universal proposals 
may consist of intervals of policies while district-specific proposals never include interval 
proposals, and tend to consist of different policies for each district. Indeed, the predicted 
proposals and policies implemented are the same only under narrow conditions. 
Remark 1 Given N > 1. Same proposals: If the proposals in a district-specific and 
a universal 'regime coincide then the proposal is I. Same implemented policies: If the 
implemented policies coincide then the universal proposal is I, [I, S;] or [S;, S1]· 
In a district-specific environment the initiative group always makes a proposal as long 
as N > 1 and there exists at least one majority coalition that is not already satisfied. But, 
with a universal proposal rule, the group may not always make a proposal since the status 
17 
quo may provide it more utility. 
2.4.2 Voter Welfare 
In most instances, the group will make different proposals under each proposal-making 
regime. An immediate question is how these proposals impact the utility of the districts 
and the initiative group. As defined in Section 3, voter welfare can only be maximized when 
each district implements policies at their ideal points. As previously assumed, there exists at 
least one majority coalition that is not satisfied, and if a district is satisfied it votes against 
any measure. Under these assumptions, voter welfare is maximized under strong conditions. 
Proposition 5 Vote'r welfare is maximized in a district-specific or universal regime, if and 
only if, all districts ideal points equal I. Proof" See Appendix. 
This result simply states that the preferences of the districts and the group must be 
completely aligned for voter welfare to be maximized. If there are districts that are not 
satisfied, such that a proposal can be made to them, the optimal proposal will not in general 
include all districts' ideal points and welfare cannot be maximized in this situation. Similarly, 
voter welfare will increase when some districts have preferences aligned with those of the 
group. Below conditions are given (sufficient and necessary separately) for voter welfare 
to increase. Whether I belongs to the preferred sets of districts plays a key role on voter 
welfare, as would be expected. 
Remark 2 Sufficient conditions. If I belongs to the preferred set of all districts, or 
all non-dominant districts, then voter welfare increases (or is the same) in a district-specific 
or universal regime. Necessary Conditions. In a district-specific regime, if social welfare 
increases then I belongs to the preferred set of at least one district. In a universal regime, if 
social welfare increases then I belongs to the preferred set of a district, or Vi belongs to the 
interval of proposals offered, for some district i. 
For example, consider two districts and the conservative district is dominant. If I belongs 
to the preferred set of the liberal district then voter welfare weakly increases in district-
specific or universal regimes. If N = 3 and there is equal-power-among-districts then any 
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two districts can form a majority coalition. If I belongs to the preferred set of the liberal 
district voter welfare does not necessarily increase since one of the districts may become 
much worse-off with the new proposal. 
Do initiative groups always prefer district-specific proposals? Yes. Under this reglme 
their utility maximization does not have the extra constraint of proposing a universal policy 
and the maximization takes place over a larger set of policies. It is clear that if single 
policies were the institutional rule, then the group would prefer these rules the least, or 
U(Xdistrict~specific, 1) 2 U(Xuniver·sal, 1) 2 U(Xsingle, 1). Single policies are an option within the 
universal regime. Interestingly, districts under not too strong assumptions prefer universal 
proposals. 
Proposition 6 The utility to the initiative group is larger or the same when making pro-
posals under a district-specific regime than under a universal regime. If the same districts 
are part of the winning majority coalition in a district-specific and a universal regime then 
voter welfare under a universal regime is larger or the same than voter welfare under a 
district-specific regime. Proof: See Appendix. 
The intuition for the result on districts' preferences is simply that an interval over a set 
of districts gives more opportunity for voter welfare to increase than offering select policies 
within the interval. This result holds when the group seeks the vote share of the same districts 
both in a district-specific and a universal regime: the majority districts get the same or more 
utility in a universal regime and minority districts cannot do worse. For example, if there are 
two districts and the conservative district is dominant, then the conservative district will be 
the majority coalition, both in a district-specific and a universal regime. The liberal district 
will do no worse in a universal regime since if an interval is offered it will include I. 
The composition of the interest group, or the membership of the districts in the group's 
utility function, will have an impact on the type of proposals made. For example, in a 
district-specific regime, if the group only cares about one district which also has majority 
vote it may offer Si or I, depending on which gets the votes from this majority district and 
to the remaining districts it can offer them their ideal points. The more "geographically" 
representative the group is, or the more diverse, the better off districts are. 
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Central agencies and Other Proposing Groups 
A natural question is whether groups would choose another form of implementation, such 
as centralized via a single agency, if given a choice. In a district-specific regime it makes no 
difference to the group who implements them since there is no leeway. But with universal 
proposals, the central agency can be the last player and his choices within the interval may 
not coincide with those of local agencies. In particular, assume the agency has its own ideal 
policy and it can choose policies from the interval subject to the constraint that a majority 
of votes is still obtained. The agency would choose policies that maximize its utility. Then, 
the group will choose centralized implementation when the central agency's preferences are 
aligned with those of the group. Otherwise, it chooses local implementation. 
The assumptions in the basic model imply the initiative group makes proposals with 
no legislature present, and no other initiative groups threatening to participate. These 
assumptions give the initiative group a quite advantageous position. In this environment, 
why aren't minority districts forming coalitions to defeat the proposals that disadvantage 
them? In the basic model, without externalities across districts, one of the equilibrium 
proposals for minority districts is to propose full discretion. If minority districts have the 
resources to participate, their optimal strategy is to offer full discretion. If this is a credible 
(or realized) threat, the initiative group will not propose. The fact that counter-proposals 
are not seen very often in real politics is probably due to high costs. 
2.5 Asymmetric Information 
The basic model has shown that proposals in multi-district models are not necessarily single 
proposals. Intervals of policies are also offered. Moreover the rules of proposal-making matter 
to the resulting policies that are implemented and the welfare of the group and districts. In 
this section I consider natural extensions to the basic model that will qualify or alter some 
of the previous results. 
Consider first the presence of asymmetric information between the proposing group and 
the agents responsible of implementing the proposal. Initiatives, whether they are local or 
not, often address complex issues about which there is some uncertainty, at least to the 
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proposer, regarding the impact of the reform. On the other hand, an agency responsible 
to implement the reform may be more familiar and knowledgeable about the interaction 
between the new policy and their particular institutions. An initiative group will then have 
to take into consideration the potential superior knowledge from the part of the implementors 
when making a proposal. The literature on principal-agents and bureaucracy suggests that 
in the presence of asymmetric information between the principal and the agent discretion 
will be offered to allow the bureaucrat to make the best choice for both parties. 9 As to be 
expected, I obtain similar findings in the context of asymmetric information between the 
initiative group and the agents of implementation. 
To introduce asymmetric information, I assume that local agents are better informed 
about a random shock introducing a reform may produce. In particular, I denote Ci = {O, I} 
the uncertain shock that additively and independently affects each district's new policy after 
a proposal is passed. The shock takes on the value 1 with probability 0:, the same probability 
for each district. Local agents know 0: and Ci while the proposing group just knows 0:. The 
general qualitative result of introducing this new assumption is that the proposing group 
is more willing to propose intervals since, when its preferences are in line with those of 
a majority district, it benefits from the local agents making better choices. This implies 
discretion can be now also be offered when preferences are similar between the group and 
the districts. 1o 
With asymmetric information a group may now offer an interval of policies whereas before 
it offered a single policy. For example, consider the simplest scenario displayed in Figure 4 
in which there is only one district VI and the preferences of the district are quadratic, with 
U(Xi; v) = -(Xi - V)2. 
[Figure 4 about here]. 
Without asymmetric information, the optimal proposal is the single proposal S~ both in 
district-specific and universal regimes. With asymmetric information the group offers either 
a single policy or an interval of policies, depending on VI'S position. At the top of Figure 
9To look at other applications of asymmetry of information in bureaucracies, see Gailmard (2000) Epstein 
and O'Hallaran (1994) and Banks and Weingast (1992). 
lOU the proposing group is better informed than the districts it can predict the shock term and take this 
into account at proposal time. New incentives for discretion do not arise. 
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4, V1 is farther away so the group offers it the policy Cl which is the policy that, given the 
random shock, gives district 1 the same expected utility as S1. 11 At the bottom of Figure 4, 
V1 is close to the group's ideal policy, therefore, the group has an incentive to offer discretion, 
specifically of the form [I -1, I] so that the agent in the district chooses a policy that benefits 
both the group and the district. Below all types of proposals are stated depending on the 
positions of S1 and V1 relative to I. 
Example 1 Assume N = 1, I = 0, V1 > 0 and the district's preferences are quadratic 
U (Xi; v) = - (Xi -v)2. Then the proposals made by the gmup, in a district-spec~fic or universal 
regzme, will be: 1) policy C1 which pmvides the same expected utility as S1 when V1 > 
~ and C1 > -0:, 2) policy -0: when V1 > ~ and C1 < -0:, 3) interval [-1,0] 
~ 2 2 ~ when V1 < vI - 0: and -(1 - 0:)V1 > -(V - Sd , 4) interval Cl when V1 < vI - 0: and 
-(1- 0:)V12 < -(V - S])2, and 5) no pmposal. 12 
With multiple districts the same general intuitions apply. In a district-specific regime, 
when seeking the votes of a majority coalition the group will offer discretion of the form 
[I - 1, I] (case 3) if there are districts very close to I. If the districts' preferred sets are far 
from I, then the group has to offer certainty equivalents, CiS, or those offers that provide the 
same expected utility as the status quo (case 1). If the ideal points of the districts are very 
far from I but their preferred sets include I then the group offers them policy I - 0: (case 
2), the optimal policy obtained from maximizing the group's utility under no discretion. 
The universal proposals are similar, with universal intervals covering the previous proposals, 
taking into consideration the possible choices of districts within the interval. 
The example shows that even in the simplest scenario the introduction of asymmetric 
information can induce the proposal of intervals of policies. Discretion can now arise from 
two sources: districts' disperse location of ideal points and status quo (N > 1) and the 
llThe cutoff Cl, determined by equating district 1 's utility from the status quo to its utility from a lottery 
on {Cl' Cl + I}, is equal to 
C1 = VI - a - Ja 2 - a + (V1 - 5d2 . 
If VI is too close to 51, then Cl cannot be defined. Therefore, the group will have to offer discretion or 
make no proposal. 
12 The gr'oup chooses discretion, no discretion or no pmposal by comparing the utilities obtained in each 
scenario. In a universal regime, with I = 0, the gmup would get fmm offeTing no discTetion, an expected utility 
equal to EU(-a,d = 0) = a 2 - a while if it offeTed discTetion its utility would be EU(-~,~) = -a(Vt)2. 
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presence of asymmetric information (N ~ 1). An interesting question is whether discretion 
dne to the two different sources can be distinctly differentiated in terms of the parameters. 
As it turns out, this may not be so simple since the motivation for discretion due to the 
position of districts remains even with asymmetric information. The follmving proposition 
presents conditions under which \ve can conclude that asymmetric information was the cause 
of discretion being offered. 
Proposition 7 1) If N = 1 then discret'ion is due to asymmetric information. 2) If N > 1 
and I belongs to the prefeTTed set of a majority coalition then discretion is due to asymmetric 
information. 3) In a district-spec~fic regime discretion is due to asymmetric information. 4) 
All else eq'U,al, as the pTefcTred sets of the distTicis become faTther away from I, discretion is 
dwo to hetemgeneity of pn'ferenccs and not to asymmetTic information. Pmoj: See Appendi:E. 
The fact that another reason has arisen for discretion may suggest that single policies 
arc offered under stricter conditions than those without asymmetric information. However, 
examples can be constructed in which a single policy is offered under asymmetric information 
when without it an interval was offered. 
Voter Welfare 
\Vith asymmetric information voter welfare will still be maximi",ed under strong condi-
tions as without asymmetric information. 
Proposition 8 ff voter welfm'e is maximized without asymmetric information then it is 
ma:rimized with asymmetric information. ConjectuTE: the conveT'se is tme. Pmoj: See 
Appendix. 
Similarly, voter welfare will go up in general in many of the cases it went up without 
asymmetric information. However, new circumstances arise for voter welfare to mcrease 
when discretion is given because a district and the group have similar preferences. 
\Vith regards to the preferences for each proposing rule the group still prefers district-
specific proposals. Unlike the case without asymmetric information social welfare may go 
down when going from the district-specific regime to the universal regime and the same 
districts belong to a ma.iority coalition in district-specific and universal regimes (Proposition 
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6). The intuition for this is that in a district-specific regime some districts (whose votes are 
not needed) may benefit from discretion given to them. But, in a universal regime it may 
not be to the advantage of the group to offer discretion to them again due to the choices 
made by other districts with more weight if discretion were provided. 
Incentives to Acquire or Claim Asymmetry of Information 
An interesting question is whether districts have an incentive to claim there is asymmetry 
of information, or whether they have an incentive to develop asymmetric information between 
them and the group. ~With regards to claiming there is asymmetry of information I conjecture 
districts are not better off. With asymmetry of information districts get either an interval 
that starts from I (if the district is close to 1) or the interval starts from 5; (if district 'i's 
votes are needed and its ideal point is far) or a single policy Ci which is the policy that with 
the shock E gives the same expected utility as 5 i . All of these are policies that if there were 
no asymmetry of information would give the district the same or less utility. The district 
then has no incentive to claim there is asymmetry. 
However, districts have an incentive to "develop" asymmetry of information. Consider 
the simple one district example in which the district's ideal point is close to I but I does 
not belong to the district's preferred set. With asymmetry of information the group may 
offer the interval [I - 1, I] if the district is close enough. The district then gets utility from 
a lottery over I and Vi. \,yithout asymmetry of information the district just gets 5 i . Being 
close to I can be an incentive for a district to develop asymmetric information. 
2.6 Externalities Across Districts 
So far the assumption has been that voters in each district care only about the policies 
implemented in their district. This assumption is relaxed by assuming that each voter now 
has a utility function that may depend on the policies implemented by other districts. For 
example, for quadratic utilities a voter's utility function may now be 
U(X; Vk) = L -ajk(Xj - Vk)2. 
j 
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The weights aJk may correspond to the size of the districts, or to the proximity of other 
districts to the voter's district. The voter's utility function will be maximized when all 
districts which the voter cares about are enacting policies at the voter's ideal point. Since 
voters now care about other districts' policies, the initiative group will have to take into 
consideration how the policies implemented in districts outside the winning coalition impacts 
majority districts whose votes it is trying to obtain. 
Proposals 
The basic motivation to offer an interval of policies under the universal regime will still 
remain when majority districts' ideal points and status quos are quite separate from the 
group and from each other. In general, discretion will be offered due to heterogeneity of 
preferences, as in the benchmark model, but also due to compensation. That is, the group 
may have to offer an interval of policies when without externalities it offered a single policy 
if the status quo of minority districts are very close to the majority districts' ideal policies or 
majority districts disproportionally care more about other districts' policies than their own. 
With regards to single policies one may suppose, given the extra restrictions introduced 
by the presence of externalities, that they occur under conditions that are a subset of those 
that give single policies without externalities. This is not necessarily the case. Consider, for 
example, N = 2, WI > ~ and I belonging to PI in a district-specific regime. Then without 
externalities the group offers I. With externalities, if I does not belong to the preferred 
set of district 2, then depending on the sizes of the districts, and externality preferences, 
it can be optimal for the group to offer I to district 1 but some other policy P2 to district 
2 (for example if a12 = 0 or district 1 does not care about its own policy). The following 
proposition gives sufficient conditions for a single policy that go beyond simple alignment 
with the group's preferences, as was the case without externalities. 
Proposition 9 Under district-specific or universal regimes, if I belongs to the preferred sets 
Pi of a majority coalition and the Si'S of the districts o'utside the majority coalition do not 
belong to UM Pi of the majority districts, then I is offered as a single policy. Proof: See 
Appendix. 
The condition presented in Proposition 9 is quite strong. The added condition, compared 
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to the case without externalities, is that districts outside the majority coalition have status 
quo that are worse than their own status quo, so the group, to a certain extent, is less 
constrained by the externalities. 
Another simple example can further clarify some of the features of the model with ex-
ternalities. Assume again N = 2, district one is a majority district or WI > ~, and 0012 = WI 
and 0021 = W2 or the districts care about each other's policies proportionally to size. Figure 
5 shows the policy line with the ideal points of the two districts and the group. The group 
must take into consideration the points Cl and CI that give district 1 and the group the same 
utility as the status quO. 13 In a district-specific regime the group offers the points {52, 5d 
if CI < Cl. This will happen when 51 is closer to I than 52 is closer to VI, as is the case in 
Figure 5. On the other hand, it offers Cl to both if Cl > CI or 52 is closer to VI than 51 to I. 
In general there is a tendency to shift (though not necessarily shrink) towards the ideal 
points of the winning majority coalition when the status quos of the districts that they care 
about are within their preferred sets Pi. On the other hand, if the status quo of the minority 
districts are outside of the preferred sets of the majority districts, then proposals will be 
similar to those without externalities. For N=2 we have the following sufficient conditions 
for single policies. 
Remark 3 If N =2, WI > W2 and 0012 = WI and 0021 = W2· Then if status quos are on the 
other side than VI a single policy is offered in a district-specific regime. If districts are both 
on one side then in a universal regime a single policy is offered. 
Voter Welfa're 
With externalities the voter welfare function is still the sum of the weighted utilities of 
each district. In the case of quadratic utilities, 
13Thesc equivalency points are for the two district example equal to 
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Without externalities the social welfare is maximized when each district implements 
policies at their ideal points or Xi = Vi. With externalities social welfare is maximized 
taking into consideration the preferences of all districts. In particular, the policy in each 
district must satisfy the following for quadratic utilities: 
(2.1 ) 
In general, only under very restrictive conditions will the policies offered coincide with 
those that maximize social welfare, for an arbitrary set of initial status quos and ideal points. 
Proposals by the group may improve or decrease social welfare, as was the case in the basic 
model or with asymmetric information, in comparison to the status quo. 
The most striking difference in terms of social welfare with externalities though is that 
having a group propose an initiative may actually raise social welfare compared to the full 
discretion case, where districts can choose their local ideal points. The intuition is simply 
that in an attempt to get votes from majority districts the group is choosing policies that 
without coordination districts on their own would not choose. Although the group may not 
quite pick a policy as determined in (1) it may do a better job than simply choosing Vi's. 
Incentive to Claim Externalities are present 
The group has an incentive to claim externalities are present, in general, when its ideal 
point is in between those of districts that have opposite preferences. 
Proposition 10 1) N=2, 'WI > ~ and Vis are on each side of I, and I does not belong to 
their preferred sets. Then the group is better off 'With externalities. 2) N=2, 'WI > ~ and Vis 
are on same side of I, and S2 belongs to Pl. Then the group is 'Worse off 'With externalities. 
Froof: See Appendix. 
Similarly, simple examples with N = 2 districts can be constructed in which a majority 
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district has an incentive to claim externalities are present. 
2.7 Conclusion 
Initiatives that reqUIre local implementation are common in particular in areas of social 
welfare, environment and criminal justice. They constitute a distinct problem from that often 
studied in the initiative literature due to the presence of three factors: multiple districts, 
multiple agents, and externalities. This chapter focused on the impact of local preferences 
and characteristics on the types of proposals made and on welfare. 
Most importantly, I found that the array of policies in a multi-district setup is larger 
than in previously studied single-district models. In particular, initiative groups can make 
offers that involve intervals of policies. Discretion, that is offering an interval of policies, can 
occur when voters have heterogeneous preferences or due to asymmetry of information, when 
local agents have better information than the proposing group. I also found that different 
types of proposal-making rules matter differentially to the group and the districts. As would 
be expected, the initiative group is better-off under a regime that allows district-specific 
proposals while, under weak restrictions, districts are better-off if the group is constrained to 
universal proposals. In terms of welfare, proposal-making hardly ever maximizes the voters' 
welfare. It can improve it, but under strong conditions. Finally, with asymmetric information 
districts that have preferences aligned to those of the group may have an incentive to develop 
asymmetric information, while the group may have an incentive to claim externalities are 
present when it is placed in a mediating position between districts. 
The structure of this problem is applicable to many other scenarios in which a majority 
vote is sought from among a group of constituents who may care about what each other 
does. Legislators in Congress, or members of international trade organizations, are some 
relevant examples. There are several aspects of the present model that deserve further 
examination, and these extensions may vary depending on which application we have in 
mind. If we continue with the initiative process as the application, we might consider, for 
example, further constraints on the proposer, and other voting rules. 
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2.8 Appendix A 
Proof of Proposition 1: Case 1) The winning coalition must include i. Offering S; to i ensures 
passage and gives the group the most utility from i by definition of S;. Offering I to the remaining 
districts maximizes overall utility. Case 2) The group ranks all districts by their weighted values 
W(u(S;; I). Any majority coalition needs d districts in it by assumption. Choosing the first d 
with the smallest weighted values achieves majority. Offering to the d districts their Sis provides 
the maximum utility to the group from these districts and offering to the remaining districts I 
maximizes the group's overall utility. All other cases 3) The group compares and ranks all possible 
majority coalitions in which the members of the winning coalition are offered their Sis (maximum 
utility to be extracted from coalition that ensures passage) and the remaining districts, if there 
are, are offered I (maximum utility to be extracted from remaining districts). The group picks the 
proposal that offers it the maximum utility. By construction, this is the optimal proposal. 
Proof of Proposition 2: (Sufficiency). If I is weakly preferred by a majority coalition, then 
the initiative group proposes I, which passes, and the group's utility is maximized. (Necessity). 
Assume I does not belong to the preferred set of any majority coalition. If there are districts 
outside the majority coalition, then by Proposition 1, they are offered I. By assumption those in 
the majority coalition cannot all be offered I. Then a single policy is not offered. If there are no 
districts outside the majority coalition then N=l or N=2 and WI = W2 = ~. N>l by assumption. 
With two districts of equal weights, one of them is offered S; ± c to their advantage and the other 
is offered I such that a single policy is not offered. 
Proof of Proposition 3: Case 1) The winning coalition must include i. If I belongs to Pi then 
S; =1 and the optimal offer is I. If I does not belong to Pi, then the optimal offer is S;, if there 
are no districts with ideal points in [S;, I] or on the opposite side of I. Otherwise, the group 
offers [I, Stl- Case 2) Consider an interval covering the S; (or Vi) points of the closest M districts 
to I that form a majority coalition. The interval will be of the form [S;, S;] or [Vi, Sj]. By 
construction these districts will approve the measure. It is not optimal for the group to expand 
the interval towards I since by assumption there are no districts on the other side of I. It is not 
optimal for the group to move the interval "one-district-down" since the S; of the closest district 
is lost, and the S; of the new added district is further out than the previous policy endpoint. All 
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other cases 3) The group compares and ranks all possible majority coalitions in which the members 
of the winning coalition are offered intervals of policies that cover their Sts (or Vis). The group 
picks the proposal that offers it the maximum utility. 
Proof of Proposition 4: (Sufficiency). If 1) holds then I, a single policy, is offered. If 2) holds 
then offering St achieves majority vote. Since districts are aligned and there is no ideal point 
between St and I all districts will pick policies at St or farther out. The single policy St is then 
optimal. (Necessity). Assume 1) and 2) do not hold. Then I does not belong to the preferred set 
of any majority coalition and it cannot be offered. Moreover districts are not aligned no single S* 
, 'z
achieves majority vote, or if an St achieves majority vote then there is an ideal policy V between 
it and I. If districts are not aligned then the group does not offer a single policy on one side of the 
group, offering policies on both sides or I is preferred. I cannot be offered since it does not belong 
to the preferred set of any majority coalition. If no St achieves majority vote then none is offered 
as a single policy. If a V exists between any St that achieves majority vote and I then it is not 
optimal since [V, Stl is preferred. No single policy is then offered. 
Proof of Proposition 5: (Sufficiency). If all districts have ideal points at I, and by assumption 
at least one majority coalition is not satisfied, then the group offers I, in a district-specific or 
universal regime, and voter welfare is maximized. (N ecessity). Assume there exists one district 
whose ideal point is not I. In a district-specific regime the district is offered either St or I by 
Proposition 1. If I is offered then social welfare is not maximized. If St is offered then, for social 
welfare to be maximized, Vi = St. If so, the district votes no on the proposal, implying the group 
should have offered it I. Social welfare is then not maximized. In a universal regime the proposal 
is a single policy or an interval. If the proposal is a single policy and social welfare is maximized, 
then all districts must have the same ideal point. By assumption there exists at least one majority 
coalition which is not satisfied. Therefore, there exists a policy S* that is closer to I than the 
ideal point and has majority vote. Offering the ideal point is not optimal and social welfare is not 
maximized with a single policy. If the proposal is an interval and social welfare is maximized, then 
all ideal points must be included in the interval. Therefore, offering the interval is not optimal and 
social welfare is not maximized with an interval. 
Proof of Proposition 6: In a universal regime the group maximizes over a smaller set of policies 
than in a district-specific regime. Then the group's utility is the same or less. For the second part of 
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proposition, assume districts which vote yes and constitute a majority coalition in a district-specific 
regime are the same districts in a winning coalition in a universal regime. Then, in a universal 
regime these districts are the same or better off than in a district-specific regime. Districts which 
are not in the winning coalition are offered the same as in a district-specific regime (I) or better. 
Assume they are offered worse than before, that is a policy worse to them than I. Then, it is 
optimal for the group to extend the interval or single point being offered up to I. The expansion 
includes points closer to I. If any district changes its choice it will be to policies closer to I. Since 
all districts are better off or the same, social welfare never decreases. 
Proof of Proposition 7: 1) If N = 1, and there is no asymmetric information, in a district-
specific or universal regime, then the optimal policy is the single policy S7 and no discretion is 
offered. 2) If N > 1, there is no asymmetric information and a majority of districts prefers I to 
their status quos, then, in a district-specific or universal regime, the group offers the single policy 
I and no discretion is offered. 3) In a district-specific regime, without asymmetric information, 
the optimal solution is given by Proposition 1, which does not involve discretion. 4) Fix N , and 
I. If all Pi are outside [-1, 1] then the group does not profit from offering discretion of the form 
[I - 1, I] since all districts will pick the endpoints for any given random shock. 
Proof of Proposition 8: If social welfare is maximized in a district-specific or universal regime 
without asymmetric information, then by Proposition 5 all districts have I as their ideal point. Then 
in a regime with asymmetric information the optimal offer for the group is the interval [I - 1, I] 
such that agents in each district choose optimally I. Social welfare is maximized. Conjecture: The 
converse is true. 
Proof of Proposition 9: If I belongs to the preferred set of a majority coalition, then offering I 
increases the term in the utility function of the majority districts that depends on policies in their 
own districts. If the status quos of the districts outside the coalition are not in the preferred sets of 
any majority district, then forcing these districts to implement I is a utility improvement for the 
majority districts. 
33 
Figure I: Two districts and the initiative group 
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Figure 2: District-specific proposals 
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Figure 3: Heterogeneous preferences and discretion 
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Figure 4: Asymmetric Information 
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Figure 5: Two districts and externalities 
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Chapter 3 Education Ballot Measures: Participation 
and Voting 
Summary 
In this chapter I investigate how voters participate and vote on educational measures. The analysis 
is conducted on three levels of California data on initiatives: state-wide, county level, and individual 
level survey data. Examining initiatives in California at the state-level in the last three decades, I 
find that educational measures are no different than non-educational measures, in terms of turnout 
and support. Examining initiatives in California at the county-level in 1998, I find that support 
for educational measures display some biases from the general voting population along racial lines. 
Finally, looking at exit-poll data from California's Proposition 227 on bilingual education, I find 
evidence consistent with local school conditions playing a small role in voters' decisions. 
3.1 Introduction 
Reforms in education are routinely promoted by various government bodies, such as Congress, 
state legislatures, state departments of education or local offices of the superintendent. In 
California and across the nation, statewide ballot measures have increasingly become an-
other tool of reform to address concerns with education. l In fact, in California between 
1970 and 2000, 54 educational measures have been placed in the ballot constituting close 
to 13% of all propositions. Many of the educational measures are educational bonds placed 
by the legislature and related to financial issues. However, in the last decade California has 
also seen a rise in propositions that specifically target school reforms, such as initiatives on 
bilingual education, class size reduction, and vouchers. Since voters are the decisive factor 
in policy-making with educational measures, to make any assessment of such measures as 
a representative and responsible means of policy reform, it is important to understand first 
1 Initiatives are measures proposed by citizens while referendums are measures proposed by the legislatures. 
In this chapter I consider both and refer to them as ballot measures or propositions. Twenty-four states 
allow direct legislation, many of them western states. 
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how voters participate and vote on them. 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess how citizens participate and vote on educational 
measures in comparison to other measures, and in comparison to what we know about voting 
in candidate elections. In particular, do educational initiatives elicit the participation and 
vote of different subsets of the general voting population? Do voters vote informedly on 
educational initiatives?2 
Research has been done from different perspectives that addresses issues of effectiveness 
and representation with regards to initiatives in general. This literature includes analysis 
of the consequences of direct democracy on minority groups (Gerber, Hajnal, and Louch 
2000; Tolbert and Hero 1996; Wenzel, Donovan and Bowler 1998), studies on the effect 
of initiatives on participation and civic life (Boehmke 2000; Tolbert, Grummel, and Smith 
2000), and broad assessments of the ini tia ti ve process and its common criticisms (Donovan 
and Bowler 1998; Gerber 1996).3 With regards to educational initiatives the research is more 
limited, with case studies of the impact of educational measures (Lopez 2000; Rosell 2000), 
and studies of the impact of politics on educational ballots (Ji 1999; Locker 1993). 
The present chapter extends the inquiries from the general literature on initiatives to the 
realm of educational initiatives. In terms of representation, I look at how various racial and 
economic groups participate and vote on educational measures. More generally, I compare 
educational and non-educational initiatives by turnout and support levels. In terms of ef-
ficacy, I look at how voters use local information, and how they respond to the historical 
context. California, with its rich initiative history and diverse population, is an excellent 
arena in which to conduct such a study. 
I begin the analysis by testing for differences between educational and non-educational 
initiatives in terms of overall participation and support. The differences in participation can 
stem from biases in terms of the type of voters who turnout to vote for educational measures, 
while the differences in support can stem from differences in the level of uncertainty regarding 
different initiatives and the level of information available on them. Examining 430 initiatives 
2See Donovan and Bowler (1998) for a discussion on responsiveness and responsibility in the initiative 
process. 
3See Bowler, Donovan, and Tolbert (1998), Magleby (1984), and Cronin (1989) for detailed accounts on 
direct legislation. 
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at the state-level in California during 1970-2000, I find very little evidence of any systematic 
differences in turnout and support when comparing educational initiatives to other types 
of propositions. The effects of the saliency of education (which may increase the level of 
information on the issue and decrease uncertainty) can be seen when educational bond and 
non-bond measures are studied separately. Educational bonds were more likely to pass 
after 1984, after tax and education finance reforms in California that restricted local school 
funding. 
Next, I examine how educational measures fare in terms of turnout and support from 
different groups of voters. Racial/ethnic interpretations of public policy predict that policies 
targeting minority groups are more likely to be adopted in states with large minority popula-
tions (Giles and Evans 1986; Key 1949; Tolbert and Hero 1996). Studying county level data 
from initiatives in 1998's primary and general elections, I find no evidence supporting any 
further biases in turnout from the pre-existing, well-documented biases in the general voting 
population (Campbell et al. 1960; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosen-
stone 1980). In terms of support, however, I find some evidence that counties with higher 
proportions of whites were more likely to support measures disadvantageous to minorities or 
not supported by minorities. With regards to how voters decide on educational issues, 1998 
exit poll analysis from California's Proposition 227 on bilingual education suggests voters 
voted mostly based on race, ideology and opinions: local school conditions as measured by 
standardized scores had a negligible impact on votes. 
These results imply that voting on educational measures displays some of the features, 
positive and negative, we may expect based on our general knowledge of voting and partici-
pation in elections. When salient, educational measures are associated with higher passage 
rates. When the historical context prompted readjustments, voters have been more support-
ive of educational measures that provided those balances. The evidence suggests educational 
measures do not induce further biases in turnout from the general voting population. These 
are positive aspects of educational measures that we may anticipate and want in any mea-
sure type. On the other hand, educational measures are subject to some less immediate 
qualifications: voters do not seem to be using local information when voting, and race can 
playa significant role in predicting support for measures that can impact minorities. 
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3.2 Hypotheses and Related Literature 
The goal in this chapter is to assess the use of initiatives in education in terms of who votes 
and how they vote. I pursue the following lines of inquiry: 1) Are there any systematic differ-
ences between educational and non-educational measures in terms of turnout and support? 
2) How does the saliency of education, as measured by the relative number of educational 
initiatives, impact turnout and votes? 3) How did the historical context (tax reforms, decline 
in student performance) impact turnout and support? Next, focusing on educational ballots 
I ask: 1) How do racial and economic divides impact voting on educational measures? 2) Do 
local school conditions matter when voting on educational measures? 
Educational initiatives will differ in terms of turnout or support from non-educational 
initiatives if, there are biases in terms of the type of voters who turnout to vote for educational 
measures, or there are differences in terms of the level of information and uncertainty by 
initiative type. Saliency of an issue, as measured by newspaper coverage, has been shown 
to increase turnout for initiatives (Smith 1999). If education is a more salient issue (at 
least to some voters) there may be a bias in terms of turnout, though possibly not too 
large considering that many different types of initiatives are placed on the same ballot. In 
terms of support, the model in chapter 1 predicts that proposing groups anticipate voters 
preferences and propose successful measures. An inspection of initiatives in California in 
1970-2000 shows that passage of a measure is surely not guaranteed (close to 60% passed). 
In an empirical analysis, Magleby (1984) found that 53% of initiatives in California between 
1960 and 1982 experienced a reversal in support between the time of announcement and 
voting time. That is, there is some uncertainty surrounding the fate of an initiative and this 
uncertainty may vary by the type of initiative. Given these factors, I expect that if there are 
any differences between educational and non-educational initiatives with regards to turnout 
and support, these will be small. 
The second inquiry addresses the impact of saliency as measured by the relative fre-
quency of an issue on the ballot. At the national level, Smith (1999) finds that salient 
issues, as measured by the percentage of front-page coverage after the election, increased 
turnout for initiatives between 1972 and 1996. Tolbert, Grummell and Smith (2000) argue 
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that a better measure of saliency is the number of initiatives in an election which they find 
correlates with turnout. However, they look at the total number of initiatives in a ballot 
rather than the total number of initiatives of a particular salient issue. Given these results, 
I conjecture that the total number of educational measures, after controlling for the total 
number of initiatives, corresponds to higher turnout rates. In terms of support, the theoreti-
cal model of chapter 1 would predict the same passage rate for salient and non-salient issues. 
Empirical evidence (Magleby (1984)), on the other hand, suggests that initiatives are less 
successful after being first announced. If more salient issues experience less uncertainty, then 
we might expect that larger (relative) numbers of educational measures positively impact 
the probability of passage of such measures. 
California experienced a reform of its property tax and school finance system in the late 
seventies and early eighties due to a series of propositions and court decisions. 4 Research 
suggests that these events by themselves (Fernandez and Rogerson 1997; Fischel 1989; Silva 
and Sonstelie 1995) or the continuance of pre-existing trends in the state's public policies 
(Kiewiet 1999) resulted in California having an expenditure per pupil in the 1980's that 
ranked 41st among US states. These low expenditures corresponded to large class sizes 
and low level of resources. Furthermore, Hispanic immigration into California escalated in 
the eighties and nineties, aggravating class size problems while possibly contributing to the 
"white flight" to private schools. If the tax and financial reforms, and the educational decline 
contributed to the saliency of education, this could have corresponded with higher turnout 
and passage rates. 
Racial/ethnic interpretations have been given to explain the passage of initiatives that 
target minorities. Tolbert and Hero (1998) suggest that states with "bifurcated" racial pop-
ulations, that is states with large minority populations, are more likely to pass initiatives 
that target minorities since these large minority populations pose a threat to the white pop-
ulation who are in turn more likely to vote. Studying California's Proposition 187, or the 
4Proposition 13 (1978), and Proposition 4 (1979) put a limit on the rates that could be assessed on 
property taxes, and in the view of some had dire consequences on local finances, in particular on funding for 
schools (Shrag 1998). Proposition 37 (1984) created California's state lottery with a percentage of winnings 
for education. Another event that shaped education's finances were the court decisions of 1971 and 1976 
which forced equalization of expenditures by pupil in the state and, by the mid-eighties, close to 95% of all 
school districts were within the permitted limits (Kiewiet 1999). 
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"illegal immigration" proposition, and Proposition 227, which aimed to dismantle bilingual 
programs, researchers have found evidence that race and ethnic polarization mattered (Al-
varez and Butterfield 1999a; Alvarez 1999b). Since increasingly public schools are populated 
by minority students, while their representation in the voting population continues to be 
small, I conjecture that racial and ethnic divides will playa role as well when looking at 
the support for California's educational measures. That is, I conjecture that non-minority 
voters will be reluctant to support reforms that may take funds from other programs or that 
are viewed as pro-minority. 
I end the assessment of educational initiatives by addressing voter competence. Looking 
at a single issue type (insurance) Lupia (1994) finds that voters' use of informational short-
cuts in the form of the identity of the endorsers was sufficient to allow voters to make the 
"correct" choice. Preliminary research by Ji (1999) finds that counties with high levels of 
students enrolled in college tracks are more supportive of educational measures in general. 
Compared to some complex measures, information about the conditions of schools may be 
acquired with less difficulty, in particular if a voter has children. Normatively we may want 
voters to, all else constant, seek reforms when their districts are under more duress. I hy-
pothesize that lower student performance in schools will have a positive impact on turnout 
and support for educational measures. 
3.3 Comparisons of Educational and Non-Educational 
Initiatives in California, 1970-2000 
General Trends 
I want to test for any systematic differences between educational and non-educational 
measures in terms of turnout and support. If educational measures systematically differ from 
other types of measures, this would suggest voters who turnout for educational measures are 
a biased set from the voting population, or educational measures experience different level 
of uncertainty than other types of measures. Table 1 below presents the mean turnout of 
eligible voters and mean passage rate for California's propositions between 1970 and 2000, 
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as a preliminary overview of the data. Note that passage is a binary discrete variable, coded 
as a one or zero, which indicates whether the proposition obtained more than 50% of the 
votes.5 
[Table 1 about here]. 
The well-known decline m turnout of eligible voters is displayed in the figures: from 
an average turnout of close to 44% and 43% for educational and all other propositions 
respectively before 1984 down to an average turnout of 34% and 36% after 1984. The declines 
in turnout are statistically significant at the 95% level in a two-tailed t-test of equality of 
means. However, when educational measures are compared to all other measures, t-test 
reveal no statistical difference at the 95% level in turnout overall nor by sub-periods. 
The passage rate for the whole period of educational measures, 62.9, cannot be statisti-
cally distinguished in a differences of means test (95% level) from the passage rate of all other 
measures, 62.2. But if we consider the periods before and after 1984, or sub-divide measures 
further by whether they are bonds or not, then statistical differences appear. 6 If the type 
of proposition is held constant, educational measures increased their average passage rates 
from 59% before 1984 to 68% after 1984, while non-educational measures' decreased, from 
65% to 59%. These changes are all statistically significant at the 95% level. The increase 
in education's passage rates may be partly due to the increase in the proportion of bonds 
among educational measures, from 31% to 56%. Non-educational measures actually also 
experience an increase in the proportion of bonds, though smaller, from 15% to 19%, which 
suggests the proportion of bonds cannot entirely explain the patterns observed. 
Finally, education measures can also be considered by the different types of issues they 
address, as seen in Table 2. In particular, I consider 5 types of propositions in education: 
finance, bonds, facilities, program reforms, and regulations. Overall educational bonds are 
most likely to pass, at 82.6% and have, with regulations, the highest turnout at 40%. The 
differences in turnout rates are not significant across types but the passage rates of educa-
5Since their inception, all of California's statewide initiatives require strict majority of votes for passage, 
or above 50% of the votes. 
6The cut point at 1984 is convenient in that it divides the period into two equal sets but meaningful as 
well since in 1984 Proposition 37 passed, establishing funding for schools via California's state lottery. This 
initiative was the first measure to begin redressing the financial changes implied by Proposition 4 (the Gann 
initiative) in 1979. In 1988 it was followed by Proposition 98, guaranteeing minimum funding for schools. 
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tional bonds are significantly higher than those of other types. Bonds, facilities and financial 
measures have all increased in their passage rates. 
[Table 2 about here]. 
State-Level Multivariate Analysis, 1970-2000 
The previous tabular analysis suggests that with respect to passage rates factors such as 
the proportion of bonds and the time period matter. These factors arc better controlled for 
in a multivariate analysis. I estimate next rolloff and probability of passage as a function of 
electoral factors, economic conditions, types of propositions, and a time trend. 7 
Table 3 presents the results from estimating a group logit model where the dependent 
variable, rolloff, is California's number of voters on an initiative divided by the number 
of voters \vho turned out in an election, measured between 0 and 1, for each of the 430 
measures between 1970 and 2000. Structural tests (Chow tests) indicate that the coefficients 
in general elections are different from those in primary elections. Therefore, separate analyses 
were done for general and primary elections. To account for a possible time trend indicator 
variables were included for four year intervals. For a better interpretation of the results, the 
last column in each table includes changes in the resulting proportion of roll off [0-1] as a 
result of increasing discrete variables from 0 to 1, holding all other variables at their means. 
Continuous variables were increased from one standard deviation below their mean to one 
above. The general fit of the model is good, with R 2s above 0.5 for both general and primary 
elections. 
[Table 3 about here]. 
Voter rolloff rates are higher for educational propositions after 1984, both for general 
and primary elections. The increases from before to after 1984 are small, though, about 1% 
and are not statistically different from zero at the 95% level. This suggests voters were not 
inclined to turnout more after California's school finance reforms, as initially conjectured. 
The number of measures and the number of measures in education also did not seem to have 
a strong impact on turnout. The number of propositions (or educational initiatives), in a 
7Each of these controls have been found to be significant in previous literature (Bowler, Donovan, and 
Tolbert 1995; I3anducci 1995a; Ji 1999). The author is in the process of adding spending which was also 
found to be significant in the literature. 
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state with high levels of proposition activity, has a minimal effect on rolloff. 8 
When considering different types of propositions, those that deal on issues of public 
morality (such as gambling or gay marriage) elicited the highest turnout: 6% more than 
government related measures, the category excluded. And those differences are statistically 
significant at the 95% level when compared to any other type, including educational mea-
sures. The effect on rolloff of educational measures cannot be distinguished from that of 
health, transportation and environment and crime. That is, in terms of rolloff, educational 
measures are not particularly distinctive from other social welfare propositions. 9 
I present next in Table 4 the results of logistic models predicting the probability of 
passage of propositions in g'eneral and primary elections. The general fit of the models is 
low (pseudo-R2 near 0.2). Passage of an initiative depends more on the proposal capturing 
voters' preferences at a given time and, at least in theory, less so on the type of initiative or 
type of election. With regards to timing effects there is evidence of lower passage probability 
before 1984, close to 0.17 less in general elections and 0.04 less in primary elections, though 
the effects are not statistically significant at the 95% level (p-values of 0.25 and 0.34). 
When the analysis is repeated considering whether an initiative is on education or not, 
and a bond or not, statistically significant differences appear (see Appendix A for details). 
In particular, educational bonds were 0.52 more likely to pass than educational non-bonds in 
general elections. The fact that educational bonds are much more likely to pass than educa-
tional non-bonds would be consistent with these initiatives experiencing less uncertainty than 
educational non-bonds. Educational bonds have the clear objective to raise funds. However, 
non-educational initiatives, did not display a similar relation when comparing bonds and 
non-bonds. Clearly, this puzzling result deserves further study. 
The number of measures has a negative impact on the probability of passage, while the 
number of educational initiatives has a positive impact on the probability of passage. These 
effects are statistically significant at the 95% level for general elections, though not for 
primary elections. That is, in general elections the increase in the number of initiatives from 
8Tolbert, Grummel and Smith (2000) find that the number of initiatives does have an impact on turnout 
but their analysis is across all states. 
9The different types of initiatives within education (bond, finance, facilities, regulation and techniques) 
did not have a differentiated effect on turnout (this analysis is not included in Table 3). 
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one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean (roughly 
10 initiatives), holding all other variables at their mean, corresponds to a decrease in the 
probability of passage of 0.33. On the other hand, going from 1 educational measure to close 
to 4 measures (one standard deviation below and above the mean), increases the probability 
of passage in general elections by close to 0.45, or close to 0.15 for each added educational 
measure. Interestingly, this result holds, even in magnitude, when only non-educational 
measures are considered (the change in probability is 0.48). This result suggests when an 
issue is salient unrelated issues may benefit indirectly. 
[Table 4 about here]. 
With regards to measure types, as with turnout, there are no systematic patterns. In 
general elections, except for initiatives related to civil rights, no other initiative type has a 
statistically significant effect at the 95% level on passage compared to governmental initia-
tives, the category excluded. In primary elections, initiatives related to crime issues have 
a positive, statistically significant effect on the probability of passage: close to 0.08 more 
compared to governmental initiatives. As mentioned earlier, educational initiatives were less 
likely to pass before 1984, in both general and primary elections. However, these effects are 
not statistically significant at the 95% level. 
In this section I found that educational and non-educational measures are not systemati-
cally different in terms of rolloff and passage. Within educational initiatives, bonds are more 
likely to pass than non-bonds. Non-educational initiatives do not display similar differences. 
The overall review did not find any evidence that educational propositions are any worse 
than other propositions to implement reforms. However, this review was at the state level, 
without providing any information about linkages between race, income and ideology on 
voting. In the next section I specifically address participation and voting by groups within 
the population. 
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3.4 County Level Participation and Voting By Groups 
of Voters, 1998 Elections 
The objective in this section is to assess whether there are any tendencies by groups in the 
population to turnout or support educational measures. Racial/ethnic theories of how public 
policy is shaped predict that dominant groups, in this case whites or high income groups, 
would vote against measures that favor large minority groups. To test this, I look at turnout 
and support in California's 58 counties during its primary and general elections in 1998.10 
In that year, 21 measures were voted on, four of which were on educational issues, one of 
which was an educational bond. The demographic and economic variables that are included 
are indicator variables for: high percent of pro-Davis (Democratic governor) voters, high 
percent of eligible voters within parenting years (18-50), high income, high percent white 
and Hispanic, high percent above 65 years old, unemployment rate (1999), and mean years 
of schooling (1998). In general, high percentages imply the underlying continuous variable 
is above the mean of the variable. The electoral control is simply whether the election was 
a general or primary election, in this case for governor. 
[Table 5 about here]. 
Table 5 presents the results for a group logit estimation of turnout and a logit estimation 
of passage, at the county level, for initiatives in 1998. The general fit of the turnout model 
is good with an R2 of 0.88. A structural Chow test indicates that educational and non-
educational measures do not need to be considered separately. None of the interacted terms 
are statistically significant at the 95% level. Counties with larger proportions of whites, 
or high income voters, are not more likely to turn out on educational measures than non-
educational ones. That is, the county level analysis is consistent with the assertion that 
the increase in the proportion of various groups in the population across counties does not 
impact turnout on educational measures. This holds for all groups considered. 
Similarly, for the model predicting the probability of passage, no systematic biases are 
laThe motivation to choose 1998 as a year for the analysis is due to the high number (four) of initiatives 
in education in that year. In fact, only 1998, 1988, and 1978 are years that four initiatives, the maximum 
number in a year in the 1970-2000 period. 
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observed for any particular group with regards to support for ballot measures in education. 
However, the four measures in education covered different areas: bilingual education, class 
size, school budgets and a facilities bond. Bilingual education quite explicitly targets mi-
nority students, in particular Hispanics. We would expect, according to the racial/ethnic 
conflict theories, that whites would be more likely to vote for anti-bilingual measures. While 
regarding the other measures that favor general educational reforms, we might expect whites 
or high economic groups to vote against them if they believed the measure had no direct 
benefits for them. The pooled analysis may hide these differences so I consider the prob-
ability of passage of each educational measure separately. Table 6 below shows that the 
coefficients on High White Percentage are all in the predicted directions: counties with more 
whites were more likely to pass Proposition 227 (p-value = 0.83), less likely to pass Propo-
sition 8 (significant), less likely to pass Proposition 223 (p-value = 0.23) and less likely to 
pass Proposition lA (p-value = 0.52). Only the coefficient for Proposition 8, the measure 
proposing a class size reduction program, is significant at the 95% level, but the direction of 
all the coefficients is suggestive of a tendency in counties with higher percentages of whites 
to vote against measures that would be favored by minorities. 
[Table 6 about here]. 
Similarly, a slight tendency is displayed by counties with high percentages of citizens 
with high income to vote against educational measures, though only for Proposition 223 
is the coefficient statistically significant at the 90% level. Most of the coefficients on the 
Hispanic variable are not statistically significant at the 95% level except for Proposition 
227. Interestingly the counties with higher levels of Hispanics voted in favor of Proposition 
227. Given the low turnout of Hispanics, these values suggest non-Hispanics in counties with 
larger number of Hispanics may have voted in favor Proposition 227. With regards to the 
demographic variables related to age, High Percent Above 65 and High Percent 18-50, no 
systematic tendencies emerge regarding voting against educational measures. 
Counties with high levels of Democratic voters were less likely to vote for Proposition 
227 (-0.4) while these counties were more likely to support the school bond (0.25). These 
effects are all statistically significant at the 95% level. Importantly, the educational standing 
of counties, as measured by the percent of students scoring above the national median in 
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the Stanford 9 tests does not have a consistent or large impact across these educational 
measures. 
The results from the county level analysis suggest that while turnout for educational 
initiatives may not be further biased in terms of the general voting population, the impact 
of race and political ideology can be observed when looking at support for various educational 
measures. In particular, there exists a tendency for counties with higher proportions of whites 
to vote for measures that disfavor minorities and against measures that may benefit them. 
Similarly, counties with high percentages of Democrats seem to favor educational measures 
that favored minorities or traditionally minority-held views. Counties with higher income 
voters seemed to disfavor educational measures in general while age did not seem to playa 
role at the county level in terms of passage. Neither did student performance. The county 
level analysis may clearly suffer from aggregation and ecological inference problems. In the 
next section, I analyze individual survey level data that gets around those problems while 
also allowing for better controls. 
3.5 School Conditions and Voting on Proposition 227 
In this section individual level data from an exit poll after 1998 primary elections is used to 
analyze the impact of school conditions on turnout, and support for the bilingual education 
reform. ll Table 7 below shows the results from a multinomial logit model in which the 
dependent variable can take on seven categories depending on the respondent's stated reason 
for turnout (i.e., governor's election, Proposition 227, Proposition 227, etc.) The independent 
variable of interest, Percent Above 50th NPR Reading, measures the percent of students in 
the respondent's county who are scoring above the national median. The impact of this 
variable is small and negative, not statistically significant at the 90% level. Going from 27% 
to 40% of students scoring above the national median (one standard deviation above and 
below the mean) implies a 0.01 decrease in the probability of stating educational measures 
11 I thank Prof. Michael Alvarez for providing me with this data set which he used on his work explaining 
the passage of Proposition 227 (Alvarez 1999). The original sample comprised 4521 while this study only 
included 3260 voters, those from counties: Orange, San Diego, Los Angeles, Kern, and the bay area. For the 
remaining respondents their county place could not be specified. 
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as a reason for turning out to vote in the 1998 election, compared to turning out for the 
governor's election, holding all other variables at their means. That is, voters in districts that 
were doing better seemed to be less concerned with educational issues, or local conditions 
may matter in determining turnout. 
[Table 7 about here]. 
Interestingly the model has a quite poor fit, suggesting that predicting who turns out 
to vote due to educational concerns is not quite distinct from predicting who turns out to 
vote. This would be in accordance with the findings in the previous section which found no 
differential effect by groups with regards to turnout for educational measures. 
If instead we look at support for Proposition 227 in Table 8, the anti-bilingual measure, 
then being Hispanic, conservative or a member of a teachers' union has a large impact on 
support for the measure (see also Alvarez 1999b). Quite importantly the measure of local 
academic performance has very little impact on support and in the opposite direction from 
that expected. A change from one standard deviation above and below the mean (from 27% 
to 40% scoring above the national mean in reading) corresponds to an incTease of 0.02 in 
the probability of voting for Proposition 227. Voters from counties with higher scores were 
more likely to vote for Proposition 227 though the effect is not statistically significant at the 
90% level (p-value 0.38). Similarly, when a logit analysis is performed with the dependent 
variable being whether a respondent considered bilingual education to be effective or not (not 
included in Table 7) the local measure of academic performance is not significant. Ideology, 
race and occupation playa much stronger role in predicting the respondents' support. 
[Table 8 about here]. 
Individual level results suggest then that local school conditions can motivate voters, 
but not greatly, to participate. However, local conditions did not impact voters towards 
supporting an educational reform in those counties doing poorly. 
3.6 Discussion 
The beneficial or detrimental usc of the initiative process has received ample attention from 
scholars (Donovan and Bowler 1998; Gerber 1996, Magleby 1984). Critics have often pointed 
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to the potential abuse of the process by selected groups with financial resources who may 
advocate policies quite deleterious to minorities in the population, while also emphasizing 
potential problems from the side of voters, haphazardly making long-lasting policies under 
less than ideal circumstances (Magleby 1984). Advocates can point to research that shows 
that the initiative process has positive democratic effects, by increasing political attention 
and participation (Boehmke 2000; Tolbert, Grummel and Smith 2000). 
In this chapter I have examined educational initiatives in California with the goal of 
assessing their use, especially in terms of their responsiveness to voter's preferences. I opted 
to examine educational initiatives along an array of dimensions that reflect different aspects 
we may ascribe to a responsive policy institution. First of all, I compared educational 
initiatives and non-educational initiatives in California, in general, over a 30 year span, 
in terms of turnout and support. I found no systematic differences. Next, I examined 
educational initiatives in terms of issue salience and time period context. I found educational 
initiatives were more likely to pass when the issue was salient, and when historical factors 
prompted some form of remediation. Looking at county level data from 1998 elections, I 
explored biases in turnout and support from various socioeconomic and political factors. 
I found some evidence that race can play a role, while political attitudes were a strong 
predictor of support. Turnout for educational initiatives did not seem to be further biased 
from the general population. Finally, looking at individual level data, I find that poor local 
school conditions correspond to a small increase in turnout, but also to a small decrease in 
the probability of supporting an educational reform. 
The results have the immediate caveat that they are based upon an analysis of one state 
and for some of the results, particular elections. Necessary extensions would address the 
generalizability of these findings to other states and to broader periods. 
The present findings suggest that voting on educational initiatives displays many of the 
features (good and bad) that can be seen in voting in general. One aspect where we may 
have expected a "better" response is in terms of the use of local information, since many 
voters may have some first-hand experience of the educational difficulties of their districts. 
However, this was not the case. Some of the evidence presented then may qualify the use 
of educational initiatives; however, the fact that overall there were no systematic differences 
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between educational initiatives and other initiatives where the benefits and costs are more 
spread out throughout the population is encouraging. 
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Table 7. Mutlinomial Logit Model for Salience of Proposition 227 in Turnout 
by Respondents to LA Times Exit poll 1998 
Proposition 227 Salient for Turnout Coefficient SE P-value dProbability 
Compared to Turnout for Governor 
White 0.12 0.30 0.68 0.01 
Hispanic 0.49 0.33 0.14 0.05 
Black -0.83 0.45 0.07 -0.04 
Asian 0.67 0.41 0.11 0.06 
Conservative -0.07 0.17 0.70 -0.02 
Republican 0.20 0.17 0.23 0.00 
Middlle Income -0.22 0.17 0.19 -0.01 
Low Income 0.06 0.18 0.74 0.01 
Union Member 0.19 0.07 0.01 0.01 
Teacher Union Member 0.95 0.28 0.00 0.08 
Retired -0.21 0.21 0.32 -0.02 
Young 0.86 0.20 0.00 0.07 
Married 0.14 0.20 0.49 0.02 
Graduate School -0.32 0.24 0.17 -0.03 
College 0.25 0.19 0.19 0.01 
Percent Above 50th NPR Read -0.02 0.01 0.12 -0.01 
Constant -2.10 0.57 0.00 
N=3260 LR chi2(19)=104.21 Pseudo-R2=0.025 
Note: The category of comparison (from 8) is the choice of governor as a reason to tunrout in 1998 election. 
dProbability is the change in the probability Proposition 227 is mentioned as a reason for turnout compared 
to governor's race when changing each variable by one unit and holding all others at their mean. 
The continuous variable, Percent Above 50th NPR Read, is changed from one standard deviation below 
the mean to one above. 
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Table 8. Logit for Support of Proposition 227 
by Respondents of LA Times Exit Poll 1998 
Support P227 Coefficient SE P-value dProbability 
Background Factors 
White 0.09 0.15 0.54 0.02 
Hispanic -l.06 0.20 0.00 -0.25 
Black -0.15 0.20 OA6 -0.03 
Asian -0.22 0.24 0.35 -0.06 
Conservative 0.79 0.09 0.00 0.19 
Republican 0.71 0.09 0.00 0.17 
Middle Income 0.07 0.09 OA2 0.02 
Low Income -0.36 0.11 0.00 -0.09 
Union Member 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.02 
Teacher Union Member -0.59 0.16 0.00 -0.15 
Retired 0.10 0.11 0.35 0.02 
Young -0.06 0.13 0.66 -0.01 
Married 0.09 0.11 OAO 0.02 
Graduate School -0.09 0.12 OA6 -0.02 
College 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.04 
Percent Above 50th NPR Read 0.01 0.01 0.38 0.02 
Constant -0.80 0.30 0.01 
N=3260 LR ch2(25)=478.04 Pseudo-R2=0.11 
Note: dProbability is the change in the probability an educational measure is mentioned as a reason 
for turnout when changing each variable by one unit and holding all others at their mean. 
The continuous variable, Percent Above 50th NPR Read, is changed from one standard deviation 
below the mean to one above. 
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Chapter 4 Compliance with an Educational Initiative: 
What Matters? 
Summary 
Proposition 227, passed by California voters in 1998, aimed to dismantle bilingual programs for 
English learners in the state's public schools. In this chapter, I analyze the impact of various 
political, institutional and delIlographic factors on the compliance of California school districts 
with Proposition 227. From a political perspective, I find that local voter support for the measure 
had no significant impact 011 compliallce while school officials' preferences had a small impact on 
compliance. From an institutional point of view, size, locatioll and bureaucratic case to implement 
the new regulations had a strong impact on compliance. Finally, from a delllographic perspective, 
race and socioeconomic factors did not have a strong effect, after controlling for the percentage 
of bilingual students ill the district. The analysis provides evidence that institutional factors, 
possibly linked to school districts' bureaucracies, were the strongest predictors of compliance with 
Proposition 227. 
4.1 Introduction 
For several decades now scholars have been studying educational reforms promoted to im-
prove American schools by different levels of government: they studied how these reforms got 
implemented and why, ultimately, they often failed (Chrispeels 1997; Datnow 2000; Henig, 
Hula, Orr and Predescleaux 1999; Hess 1999; NCEE 1983; Ravitch 2(00). These empirical 
studies stressed different explanations about what made government and agency-developed 
school reforms work, ranging from school politics, to delllographics, and to bureaucratic in-
centives. However, in the last years, government-driven rdorms have frequently been outdone 
by citizen-driven reforms carried ont through th(~ initiative process. Educational initiatives, 
which are voted by citizens, are subject to many of the obstacles government reforms face. 
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They are also subject to some new constraints such as intense publicity, politization and 
voter awareness. Focusing on an educational initiative in California, in this chapter I study 
systematically how the different empirical factors found to influence the implementation of 
government-driven educational reforms impact citizen-driven educational initiatives. More-
over, I address the new factor, local voter support, that comes into play. 
The educational initiative I study is Proposition 227 which aimed to dismantle bilingual 
programs for English learners in the state's public schools and replace them with English-
based programs. l Proposition 227 is an ideal case to study the implementation of educational 
initiatives since it had a clear goal, it had to be implemented in many and different school 
districts, and its impact is now measurable. Furthermorc, Proposition 227 was a highly 
politicized initiative with ample voter support (61 percent). In spite of its vast support, this 
new standard was implemented differently throughout the state, with some districts fully 
dismantling bilingual programs while other districts kept all bilingual programs. However, 
the overall percentage of limited-English-proficicnt (LEP) students enrolled in bilingual pro-
grams in California declined from 29 percent in 1998 to 11 percent in 1999 (Rossell 2000). 
This is a quite dramatic decline for a long-standing program with considerable support from 
agencies in the California Department of Education. 
Previous research on educational reforms has extensively addressed why reforms fail. Al-
though these analyses are primarily concerned with explaining failing school performance, 
they have implications for the implementation of school reforms. Three distinct explanations 
emerge from the literature that focuses on externally developed school reform: school and 
community micropolitics (Brouillette 1996; Henig, Hula, Orr and Predescleaux 1999; Tyack 
and Cuban 1995), demographics and economics (Anyon 1997), and school districts' organiza-
tion and incentives (Chubb and Moe 1990; Hess 1999). In this chapter I test simultaneously 
how these different factors explain the implementation level of an educational initiative while 
also testing how a new factor, local voters support for the reform, can impact compliance. 
Comparing the percentage of LEP students enrolled in bilingual classes in California's 
school districts, before and after the reform, I find that, from a political perspective, local 
1 A bilingual program is one in which a student with limited English skills is taught in his or her first 
language for several years, and then is gradually transitioned into regular, all-English classrooms. 
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voter support for the initiative did not have a significant impact on compliance. School 
officials' preferences for the reform, as elicited from the school district's efforts to enact 
the new regulations, and the level of Hispanic and bilingual educators, had a small impact 
on compliance. Similarly, demographics had a small impact on compliance. What did 
seem to matter consistently were variables related to the organization of school districts. 
Their size, location, and their bureaucracies' ease to implement the new regulation, all had 
a strong impact on compliance. Larger, more urban districts were less likely to comply. 
Similarly districts whose bureaucracies had difficulty implementing the new regulations were 
less likely to comply. All in all, school districts seemed to respond according to their own 
institutional incentives and organization (bureaucracy and school preferences) rather than 
to demographics or external politics (voters, public visibility). 
In the following section I develop hypotheses from the literature on school reform and 
compliance. Then I introduce the data and measures used in the analysis, including district-
level data from the California Department of Education and Secretary of State. Finally, 
I test the effects of political, demographic and institutional variables on compliance, with 
implications of the results presented in the concluding section. 
4.2 Compliance and Proposition 227 
Education Reform Literature 
What factors help explain the level of compliance to external reforms in school districts? 
Most analyses of school reforms are framed quite generally, and specific models are often 
left unspecified (Hess 1999). However, the research can be broadly summarized as belong-
ing to three types of explanations: political, demographic and institutional. The line of 
research that emphasizes micropolitics in the schools is concerned with conflict among dif-
ferent interest groups in and around schools (Datnow 2000). According to this literature, 
any reform will be mediated by the interactions and interests of administrators, teachers and 
community activists (Brouillette 1996; Henig, Hula, Orr and Predescleaux 1999; Meier and 
Stewart 1991). The second line of research focuses on explanations of race and economics, 
or the demography of poverty, in urban school districts (Anyon 1997). The demographic 
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characteristics of the school district will shape the path of a reform since efforts, resources 
or preferences may not be in line with those required by the new standard. Moreover, racial 
tensions may further shape or constraint policies according to which racial group has rep-
resentative power in the district (Meier and Stewart 1991). Finally, the last interpretation 
stresses institutional and organizational aspects of school districts that can influence (and 
hinder) school reform. Chubb and Moe (1990) argue that the large bureaucracies in public 
schools hinder autonomy and promote rigidity. Hess (1999) argues that, as organized, school 
districts promote a "policy churn" in which reforms are constantly proposed and hardly ever 
enacted, in an attempt to legitimize administrator, and agency performance. 
Understanding how citizen educational initiatives get implemented is an area that has 
not been studied systematically but can obviously profit from insights from the literature on 
government-initiated school reforms. In the case of educational initiatives, the new standard 
becomes a new law which the district must implement, as in any other government-driven 
reform. However, citizen-developed initiatives are often highly politicized, publicized endeav-
ors that may mobilize parents, local community activists and even school officials. These 
extra factors, one may conjecture, make it more difficult for the implementor to shirk. 
Proposition 227 
Proposition 227 was passed by California voters in June 1998 and was implemented since 
the school year of 1998-1999. The initiative's main mandate requires that: "All children in 
California public schools shall be taught English by being taught in English. In particular, 
this shall require that all children be placed in English language classrooms. Children who are 
English learners shall be educated through sheltered English immersion during a temporary 
transition period not normally to exceed one year" (California Education Code, Article 2, 
Section 305). The exception made to Proposition 227 is that parents can request waivers for 
children who: a) know already English, b) are ten or older, c) have special needs determined 
by school staff, and d) have been placed in an English classroom for at least 30 days. Waivers 
can be initiated both by parents or the school district (with the consent of the parents). 
The final approval of waivers falls under the jurisdiction of the district's superintendent 
(California Education Code, Article 3, Section 311). The burden of proof if a waiver is 
denied falls on the district and not on the parents. Finally, Proposition 227 also allows for 
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parents to sue educators (including elected officials) who "willfully and repeatedly" do not 
comply with the law. 
In short, Proposition 227's objective was to dismantle bilingual programs, however, some 
discretion was allowed: if 20 or more students at a given grade level receive waivers the school 
district must offer them a bilingual class or allow them to transfer. Given this discretion, we 
might conjecture that the level of bilingual program dismantlement varied by school district, 
depending both on the characteristics of the student body (i.e. the demand from parents for 
waivers) and the district officials preferences (i.e. the supply of granted waivers). 
Two recent studies have looked at the case of California's implementation of Proposition 
227 and are related to the present work. Rossell (2000) looks at state-level overall trends 
of enrollment in bilingual classes up to Proposition 227 and after, while also using data 
from interviews of 50 classrooms in several of California's large school districts. Rossell finds 
that although there are significant declines in bilingual enrollment in the schools observed, 
many former bilingual students are still being taught a portion of their instruction time 
(30 percent) in their native tongue. In terms of waivers, in the schools studied these were 
often prompted from the districts: "Visiting the school to sign a parental waiver is not 
an idea that typically originates with the parent (p.51)." Gandara et al. (2000), analyze 
22 schools in 16 school districts conducting quantitative and interview analysis to address 
district compliance and impact on classroom instruction. They argue two important reasons 
for the level of compliance to Proposition 227: 1) the history of the bilingual program and 
the number of bilingual staff in the district, and 2) the leadership at the top of the district 
(superintendent) or principals. 
Measures of Compliance and Hypotheses 
The goal in this chapter is to test alternative explanations regarding compliance in edu-
cational reforms. How do we measure compliance with Proposition 227? The ideal measure 
would be to analyze the waivers requested and waivers denied. That is, ideally we would 
estimate a model that separately predicts demand and supply given various district specific 
factors. Unfortunately, this measure is not publicly available and neither was it collected by 
the California Department of Education. The measure I will use instead is the change in 
the number of bilingual students before and after the reform, relative to the LEP popula-
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tion. This measure has an apparent drawback, since we cannot estimate demand for reform 
separately from willingness to supply reform. However, Proposition 227's regulations place 
the burden of proof on districts if they deny a waiver. Also, the recent studies suggest that 
the demand for waivers was often shaped by the districts' prescriptions (or lack of). Parents 
were, 1Il many cases, willing to go along with the recommendations of teachers and school 
authorities. 
Interpreting the literature on external school reforms and the recent studies on Proposi-
tion 227 that emphasize the role of the districts leads me to posit the following hypotheses 
with regards to district compliance with Proposition 227. 
School Micropolitics. Political/educational preferences of the school leadership and 
teachers shape the level of compliance with a reform. Given evidence on how race mattered 
in voting on Proposition 227 (Alvarez 1999), I conjecture districts with higher representation 
of Hispanic officials were less inclined to implement Proposition 227. Given the fact that 
Proposition 227 aimed to dismantle bilingual education in general, I conjecture districts with 
higher percentages of bilingual teachers were less inclined to implement Proposition 227. 
Demographics. School district composition shapes reform through the representation of 
different groups at the school official level, via parental involvement and community activism, 
and by the varied response of the student population. Given theories of power conflict among 
groups (Giles and Evans 1986; Meier and Stewart 1991), I conjecture districts with more 
Hispanic students were less inclined to comply with Proposition 227, while districts with more 
blacks students were more likely to comply with the initiative. Further, I conjecture districts 
with higher levels of welfare recipients were less likely to comply due to fewer resources from 
the districts and the parents. 
Institutional. Larger districts tend to have larger bureaucracies which can constrain 
reforms. Districts located in urban areas are subject to more visibility from state-level press 
and state-level interest groups including supporters of the measure, teacher unions, regulators 
and researchers. Badly performing districts have stronger incentives to attempt new reforms. 
I conjecture then that large and urban districts were more likely to comply with Proposition 
227. Similarly districts doing poorly were more likely to comply with the initiative. 
Local Politics. Higher local voter support impacts school districts decisions through 
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community and parental activism and through local news. I hypothesize districts with higher 
percentages in favor of Proposition 227 were more likely to comply with the initiative. 
4.3 Overview of California's Compliance 
I begin the analysis with an overview of how the various factors addressed in the literature 
relate to the measure of district compliance: the change in the percentage of LEP students 
in bilingual classes in a district due to Proposition 227. The school district level of analysis 
reflects the fact that key decisions regarding Proposition 227, such as whether to inform 
parents throughout the district or the final approval of a waiver, were made at the top district 
level. In general, schools looked up to the superintendent for directions in implementing 
Proposition 227. Ultimately, an exhaustive analysis would lower the unit of analysis to the 
school level to account for school level variation, in particular, when the top level officials 
did not offer any clear prescriptions. 
In this section I present summaries of mean levels of district compliance (that is, mean 
changes in the percent of LEPs in bilingual classes) from data publicly provided by the 
California Department of Education, given various political, demographic and institutional 
variables. 2 From the sample of 860 school districts in California with English learners, close 
to 360 districts had bilingual students in 1998. It is those districts that are included in the 
present analysis. 3 I begin by looking at the impact of political factors. Table 1 presents the 
changes in the percentage of LEPs in bilingual classes, for 1998-1999 and 1999-2000, given 
local voter support for Proposition 227, the percentage of Hispanic principals in a district, 
and the decision of the school district to notify parents about their option to request waivers.4 
2 A general summary of all variables, including standard deviations, is included in Appendix A. 
3To be more precise, California has over 1,000 school districts, ranging in size from several hundred to 
several hundred thousand students. Close to 900 school districts have LEP students while over 400 had 
bilingual students in 1998. For roughly 860 school districts there is data available on all the variables of 
interest from the California Department of Education. Of the 860, close to 360 school districts had bilingual 
students in 1998 and they constitute the basis of the present analysis. 
4The compliance measure I am using is the 98-99 change in a district of the percent of LEPs in bilingual 
classes. An alternative measure is the ratio of bilingual students in 1999 to those in 1998. I chose the first 
measure since it better relates to what many policy makers seem to be targeting which is not the eradication 
of bilingual programs but the minimization of them to just those who really needed it among the LEP 
population. 
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[Table 1 about here]. 
From the tabular analysis we observe that only the percent of Hispanic principals has any 
correspondence with compliance. Districts with higher percentage of Hispanic principals, in 
particular, above 50 percent, had smaller changes in the percentages of bilingual students 
(close to 12%) than districts with less than 50% of Hispanic principals, or no principals 
(26%). Recall that for the whole state of California the percentage of LEPs in bilingual 
classes was reduced by over 18%. District voter support does not seem to correlate strongly 
with compliance. Districts supporting Proposition 227 had mean compliance changes (18%) 
that were no different at the 95% level from those that did not support the initiative (17.5%) 
in a t-test of equality of means. District efforts to comply with the regulation by informing 
parents about waivers also had no impact on compliance (mean changes were not statistically 
different at the 95% level). 
Next I look at the effect of demographic variables. As seen in Table 2 demographic 
variables do not seem to have a particularly strong impact on compliance. Going from 
districts with percent Hispanic students above 50% to those below 50% corresponds to mean 
changes in the percent of LEP bilinguals from 22% to 17%. This difference is statistically 
significant at the 95% level in a difference of means test, but it is small in magnitude. The 
impact of enrollment in CaIWORKs, California's welfare program, is negligible. 
[Tables 2 about here]. 
Finally, I look at the effects of district size and mean 1998 reading scores (see Table 3). 
From this analysis we see a distinct pattern in which larger districts (50,000+) complied 
less (11% change) while smaller districts « 500) had higher compliance (36%). These 
differences are large and statistically significant in differences of means tests. With regards to 
student performance, districts with lower mean reading scores had a positive and statistically 
significant impact on compliance, but not as strong as that of district size. 
[Table 3 about here]. 
Interestingly all the reductions seemed to take place in the first year after the reform while 
changes for 1999-2000 are quite minimal, averaging around 1.4%. This is consistent with 
an interpretation in which districts did not aim to completely dismantle bilingual programs, 
but simply incurred the least changes possible. 
75 
The preliminary analysis suggests that institutional factors, such as size, and political 
factors, such as principal's ethnicity, had a strong impact on compliance. Racial demograph-
ics and student performance seemed to have a smaller effect. But many of these factors are 
interrelated and a multivariate analysis, which I introduce next, is needed. 
4.4 Why Comply? 
To test simultaneously the different explanations on compliance I do a multivariate OLS 
analysis in which the dependent variable is the 1999-1998 difference in the percent of LEP 
students in bilingual classes. I estimate two OLS models where the second model has 
two more independent variables than the first one. In general, the independent variables 
can be grouped into four categories: institutional, demographic and political. The institu-
tional variables are related to district performance and visibility and include: Mean National 
Percentile Ranking in Reading 1998, Elementary School District, Large District (50,000+), 
Large-Mid Size District (10,OOO-50,OOO), Mid Size Distr·ict (10,OOO-2,OOO), Small-Mid Size 
District (500-2,000), City District (0-500), Mid-City District, Fringe City District, Large 
Town District, and Small Town District. The demographic variables include percent LEP 
students in bilingual classes in 1998 plus High Percent Hispanic Students (85%), High Per-
cent Black Students (15%) and High Percent Calworks (25%). The political variables or 
those related to groups' preferences: Percent Yes Proposition 227, Hispanic Superintendent, 
Percent Principal Hispanic, and Percent Bilingual Teacher. The omitted variables are Rural 
Districts and Small Districts « 500). 
Model B includes the same independent variables as in Model A plus the variables No-
tification to Parents of Waivers and Difficult to Notify Parents. The first variables is an 
indicator variable that codes 1 if the district had a notification process. The second variable, 
also an indicator, codes 1 if the district reports it had difficulties implementing the waiver 
process. The variables were obtained from a survey conducted by the California Department 
of Education of school districts in an attempt to understand district difficulties after Propo-
sition 227. Only 67% percent of districts replied to this survey and the number of districts 
in the analysis drops from 359 to 243. 
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[Table 4 about here]. 
Focusing first on Model A, the fit of the model, 0.17, implying that the percent of LEP 
students in bilingual classes in 1999 were not simply determined by the percentages in 1998, 
and other factors played a role. 
Looking first at the institutional variables, we see that districts with lower mean reading 
scores, experienced comparable reductions to those with better mean reading scores, all 
else equal. A 10 point decrease in reading scores corresponded to a 0.5% reduction in the 
percentage of bilingual LEPs, a very small amount, not significant at the 90% level. This 
implies districts experiencing more academic difficulties were not necessarily more likely to 
comply. Elementary school districts had larger reductions (by 7.4% and significant at the 
95% level), as would be expected, given the disproportionate number of bilingual students 
in earlier grades. However, the strongest institutional effects are coming from the size and 
location variables. The differences in the compliance of large-medium districts over small 
districts (the omitted category), with larger districts complying less, are over 10 percentage 
points. Interestingly the very large districts (9 districts with over 50,000 students) complied 
comparably to small districts (175 districts with less than 500). That is, size of a school 
district displays some non-linearities with the very large, and very small districts complying 
more, and comparably, while medium ranged districts (500-50,000) complied less. Districts 
located in large cities were much less likely to comply than those in suburban areas. These 
results are consistent with an interpretation in which large, urban districts, with their large 
bureaucracies experienced more inertia to change than small districts. The extremely large 
districts, despite their large bureaucracies, faced more visibility than medium sized districts 
and had higher levels of compliance. 
The political variables had modest effects on compliance. Voters support had no statis-
tically significant impact (at the 90% level) on compliance. Hispanic representation in the 
title of principal had a modest effect: a 10% increase in Hispanic principals corresponds to 
a 1% increase in the percentage of bilingual students after the reform. Similarly, the effect 
for bilingual staff is small. Interestingly, the race of superintendents or school board (not 
included in Table 4) did not seem to have a significant role in predicting compliance. 
With regards to the demographic variables, indicating high levels of Hispanics, Blacks or 
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welfare recipients, are not statistically significant at the 95% level. If the model is estimated 
with the dependent variable being the percent of LEPs in bilingual classes in 1999 (i.e. not 
the changes in enrollment but the enrollment in 1999) with the lagged 1998 percentage as 
an independent variable, then the latter is significant. That is, districts with higher levels of 
bilingual LEPs, all else equal, had higher reductions in enrollment in bilingual classes. 
Model B adds two more independent variables: Notification to Parents of Waivers and 
Difficult to Notify. I find that having notified parents of the waiver process does not have an 
impact while difficulty to implement the notification has a very strong impact on compliance. 
Deciding to notify may be viewed as a direct reflection of the top school official's preferences 
on Proposition 227, and this variable did not seem to matter. Difficulty to implement 
the notification by the bureaucracy (the survey was sent to the bilingual offices in each 
district) may be the result of mixed messages from the top officials and bureaucratic inertia. 
Furthermore, a probit model predicting notification to parents by a district (see Appendix 
B) including all the independent variables from Model A has only three variables statistically 
significant at the 95% level and they are all variables related to the size of a district. 5 
All in all, these results suggest that institutional factors (size, location, bureaucratic ease) 
were key in explaining compliance to Proposition 227. School leadership by principals also 
played a role, but a less important one, while demographic and local voter support had a 
very small impact. Figure 1 below summarizes the effects of selected variables. 
(Figure 1 about here). 
4.5 Conclusions 
The present analysis tests systematically the impact of various factors found to matter in 
the literature on compliance. In the case of implementing an educational initiative, I find 
that voter support and demographic variables playa small role while institutional factors 
and school authorities preferences have a strong impact on district compliance. In particular 
5The coefficients on the size and location variables are quite different than those estimated in Model A. 
Those for size are in particular larger, by close to 10 percentile points. This may be partly explained by the 
fact that the set of districts that responded to the survey by the CDE includes larger districts, with more 
Hispanics. If Model A is re-estimated on those selected districts then similar effects are obtained. 
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organizational factors such as SIze and location of a school district explain a considerable 
amount of the variation. The fact that small districts were more likely to comply can be 
consistent with smaller districts being subject to stricter leadership and less bureaucracy. 
Larger districts, complied less, suggesting larger bureaucracies may have experienced more 
inertia. The finding that very large districts were as likely as small districts to comply 
suggests visibility, now at the state-level, may have played a role. All in all, the results 
suggest that, among all explanations posited in the literature on education reform, school 
districts responded mostly to institutional factors. 
An immediate caveat to these results is the level of analysis. District level analysis may 
be masking school level differences, in particular demographic or political differences. Future 
research should uncover whether school demographic variations have an impact. Further-
more, districts that seemingly are complying according to their reduced number of bilingual 
students may still be using Spanish in the classrooms. Rossell's (2000) study suggests there 
is some evidence that native language is still being used but it also suggests that when bilin-
gual numbers go down in a district, some reduction in the use of LEP's primary language 
has occurred. 
The issue of compliance becomes relevant when enforcement cannot be ensured or when 
the mandate itself already provides discretion. In the case of Proposition 227, this initiative 
already provided for a loophole by allowing parents to request waivers. The present study 
suggests that education reforms will be diluted if loopholes are allowed that provide school-
level discretion. School districts will respond given their organizational and institutional 
incentives and their school authorities' preferences. Although, loopholes are often placed in 
initiatives precisely to capture voter support, as seen in chapter 1, ultimately these playa 
tenuous role at the time of implementation. 
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Tl. Changes in the Percent of LEP Students in Bilingual Classes by 
Political Factors in a School District 
Percent Yes P227 
Districts 
For P227 
Districts 
Against P227 
Percent Hispanic 
Principals in District 
No Hispanic Principals 
% Hispanic Principals < 50 
% Hispanic Principals >50 
Notification to Parents of 
Waivers 
Notified 
Did Not Notify 
1998-1999 1999-2000 
Mean % Change N, St. Dev Mean % Change N, St. Dev 
18.5 (336, 20.1) 1.3 (334.7.7) 
22.6 (62, 22.5) 1.4 (62,5.8) 
1998-1999 1999-2000 
Mean % Change N, St. Dev Mean % Change N, St. Dev 
25.7 (118,26.9) 1.5 (116,9.9) 
19.6 (372,20.9) 1.1 (370,7.1) 
11.7 (27, 14.6) 4.2 (27, 10.9) 
1998-1999 1999-2000 
Mean % Change N, St. Dev Mean % Change N, St. Dev 
18.3 (250, 18.3) 1.6 (250,8.1) 
17.5 (43,23.7) 1.4 (43,6.3) 
Source: California Department of Education website (www.cde.ca.gov). California's Secretary of State 
Supplement to Vote 1998, and California's Public School Directory. 
Note: Mean % change measures the average change in the percent of LEP students enrolled in 
bilingual classes before and after Prop 227 among districts which had bilingual students before Prop 227. 
The average changes by notification correspsonds to those district which responded to CDE's survey 
on implementation. 
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T2. Changes in the Percent of LEP Students in Bilingual Classes by 
Demographic Factors in a School District 
1998-1999 1999-2000 
Percent Hispanic Mean % Change N, St. Dev Mean % Change N, St. Dev 
Students in a District 
Percent Hispanic> = 50% 22.04 (166, 18.7) 1.38 (166,6.37) 
Percent Hispanic < 50% 17.03 (232, 17.0) 1.31 (230,8.2) 
Percent Students with 1998-1999 1999-2000 
Calworks in a District Mean % Change N, St. Dev Mean % Change N, st. Dev 
Percent on Calworks > = 25% 18.8 (54,21.6) 0.49 (53,3.2) 
Percent on Calworks < 25% 19.2 (344,20.6) 1.5 (343,7.9) 
Source: California Department of Education website (www.cde.ca.gov) and California's Secretary of State 
Supplement to Vote 1998. 
Note: Mean % change measures the average change in the percent ofLEP students emolled in 
bilingual classes before and after Prop 227 among districts which had bilingual students before Prop 227. 
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T3. Changes in the Percent of LEP Students in Bilingual Classes by 
Institutional Factors in a District 
1998-1999 1999-2000 
District Size Mean % Change N, St. Dey Mean % Change N, St. Dey 
0-500 35.8 (27,28.4) 2.1 (26,9.9) 
500-2000 25.5 (66,27.5) 1.4 (65,8.6) 
2000-10,000 17.5 (187,17.8) 1.5 (187, 7.9) 
10,000-50,000 14.5 (109, 15.4) 0.9 (109,5.1) 
>50,000 11.3 (9, 16.9) 0.2 (9,4.6) 
District Mean 1998 1998-1999 1999-2000 
Reading Scores Mean % Change N, St. Dey Mean % Change N, St. Dey 
NPRRead>55 15.5 (76,23.5) 1.3 (74, 7.0) 
NPR Read 40-55 16.9 (104,20.1) 2.2 (104,9.2) 
NPR 30-40 21 (93,20.6) 0.6 (93, 5.9) 
NPR<30 21.8 (125, 19.1) 1.1 (125, 7.1) 
Source: California Department of Education website (www.cde.ca.gov) and California's Secretary of State 
Supplement to Vote 1998. 
Note: Mean % change measures the average change in the percent of LEP students emolled in 
bilingual classes before and after Prop 227 among districts which had bilingual students before Prop 227. 
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T.4. OLS Models Predicting the Percent of LEP Students in Bilingual Classes in 1999 
Model A Model B 
Dependent Variables Coefficient SE P-value Coefficient SE P-value 
Institutional 
Mean NPR Read 1998 0.13 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.43 
Elementary School District -3.28 1.91 0.09 -2.23 2.27 0.33 
Large District 13.92 7.51 0.07 23.07 10.05 0.02 
Large-Mid District 15.91 4.29 0.00 23.16 7.51 0.00 
Mid District 16.95 4.04 0.00 23.49 7.13 0.00 
Small -Mid District 10.78 3.97 0.01 14.58 7.20 0.04 
City -0.05 5.34 0.99 -5.48 7.31 0.45 
Mid City 
-6.55 4.06 0.11 -11.51 6.18 0.06 
Fringe City -9.61 3.85 0.01 -14.97 6.00 0.01 
Fringe Mid City -8.06 4.03 0.05 -12.39 6.00 0.04 
Large Town -12.88 8.40 0.13 -16.36 10.12 0.11 
Small Town -9.77 4.66 0.04 -11.81 6.83 0.09 
Demographic 
Percent Bilingual Students 1998 0.38 0.04 0.00 0.33 0.06 0.00 
High Percent Hispanic (+85%) -1.78 3.15 0.57 1.98 3.87 0.61 
High Percent Black (+ 15%) 0.27 3.01 0.93 0.54 3.44 0.88 
High Percent CalWorks (+25%) -0.51 2.54 0.84 -4.30 2.92 0.14 
Political 
Percent Yes P227 -0.02 0.08 0.80 -0.04 0.09 0.69 
Hispanic Superintendent 0.18 2.32 0.94 0.15 2.55 0.95 
Percent Principal Hispanic 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.06 0.15 
Percent Bilingual Teacher 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.14 
Political and Illstitutional 
Notified Parents of Waivers 1.13 2.91 0.70 
Difficult to Notify Parents 7.79 2.12 0.00 
Constant -13.77 7.69 0.07 -13.55 10.20 0.19 
N=359 R-sq=0.35 N=243 R-sq=0.39 
Source: California Department of Education website (www.cde.ca.gov), California's Secretary of State and Ca10fornia's 
Public Schools Directory. 
Note: Small District and Rural District are ommitted variables. Model A includes districts that had bilingual students 
in 1998. Model B includes districts with bilingual students in 1998 and responded to CDE's survey on Prop 227. 
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4.6 Appendix A 
Appendix A. Mean of Selected School Level Variables, California 1999 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Percent Bilingual Students 1998 865 14.28 21.51 0 100 
Percent Bilingual Students 1999 865 5.70 13.11 0 100 
Percent Bilingual Students 2000 850 5.13 12.39 0 100 
Enrollment 1998 930 4322.15 18764.59 5 530030 
Percent LEP Students 898 16.93 16.67 0.48 87.98 
Percent Hispanic Students 1059 30.90 26.03 0 99.54 
Percent White Students 1059 55.44 27.85 0 100 
Percent Black Students 1059 4.05 7.04 0 71.54 
Urban School District 1315 0.40 0.49 0 1 
City School District 1315 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Mid City School District 1315 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Fringe City School District 1315 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Fringe Mid City School District 1315 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Town School District 1315 0.02 0.13 0 1 
Small Town School District 1315 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Rural School District 1315 0.14 0.34 0 1 
Small School District 1315 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Small Mid School District 1315 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Mid School District 1315 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Large Mid School District 1315 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Large District 1315 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Notify Parents Waivers 561 0.68 0.47 0 1 
Percent Yes Proposition 227 864 62.35 10.46 12.47 84.25 
Hispanic Superintendant 849 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Percent Principal Hispanic 398 20.40 22.20 0 100 
Mean NPR Read 1998 802 43.55 16.75 6 88 
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4.7 Appendix B 
Appendix B. Probit Model Predicting Notification to Parents of Waivers in 1998 
Dependent Variables Coefficient SE P-value 
Mean NPR Read 1998 0.00 0.01 0.84 
Elementary School District -0.03 0.26 0.90 
Large District 
Large-Mid District 1.64 0.70 0.02 
Mid District 1.23 0.65 0.06 
Small -Mid District 2.10 0.72 0.00 
City 0.17 0.92 0.85 
Mid City -0.27 0.76 0.72 
Fringe City -0.63 0.73 0.39 
Fringe Mid City -0.35 0.73 0.63 
Large Town 
Small Town -0.80 0.80 0.32 
Percent Bilingual Students 1998 0.00 0.01 0.41 
High Percent Hispanic (+85%) -0.42 0.43 0.32 
High Percent Black (+15%) 0.01 0.46 0.98 
High Percent CalWorks (+25%) -0.13 0.35 0.71 
Percent Yes P227 -0.02 0.01 0.11 
Hispanic Superintendent 0.36 0.35 0.31 
Percent Principal Hispanic 0.00 0.01 0.85 
Percent Bilingual Teacher 0.00 0.01 0.97 
Constant 1.07 1.02 0.30 
N=261 LR(chi)=22.78 
Source: California Department of Education website (www.cde.ca.gov), California's Secretary of State 
and California's Public Schools Directory. 
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Chapter 5 "Sink or Swim:" What Happened to 
California's Bilingual Students after Proposition 227? 
Summary 
Proposition 227, passed by California voters in 1998, aimed to dismantle bilingual programs in pub-
lic schools and to replace them with English-only programs. Bilingual education, a long-standing 
program in California, involved mostly Hispanic students of limited English skills who were taught 
at first in their native language, and then were gradually transitioned into English-only classes. 
Using individual-level data from a southern California school district, I find that in 1998, before 
Proposition 227, limited-English-proficient (LEP) students enrolled in bilingual classes had lower 
scores in reading than LEP students who were not enrolled in bilingual classes, and who were, in 
general, more proficient in English. In math, bilingual students had test scores as good as non-
bilingual LEPs'. But in 1999, after Proposition 227, the same set of students had scores in reading 
and math that were no worse than those of non-bilingual LEPs. Proposition 227, which interrupted 
bilingual programs and emphasized English instruction, did not set bilingual LEP students back 
relative to non-bilingual LEPs and may have even benefited them. 
5.1 Introduction 
Proposition 227 passed in California's June 1998 primary election with 61 percent of vot-
ers supporting the measure. The main goal of this initiative was to dismantle bilingual 
programs in public schools and replace them with programs emphasizing early English ac-
quisition. Bilingual education had been a long-standing program in California in which 
limited-English-proficient (LEP) students were taught to read and write in their native lan-
guage, and gradually transitioned to regular English instruction over a period of years. After 
Proposition 227, a child could be kept in a bilingual education program only if his or her 
parents requested a waiver and if school authorities approved that waiver. While this new 
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standard was implemented differently throughout the state, the overall percentage of LEP 
students enrolled in bilingual programs declined from 29 percent in 1998 to 11 percent in 
1999 (Rossell 2000). This shift of educational regimes, from one encouraging instruction in 
a student's primary language to one emphasizing early English instruction, affected mostly 
Hispanic students of limited English skills. Given the growth of immigration in the United 
States, it is important to understand the impact of such reforms. 
In this chapter, I examine the academic performance of LEP students who were enrolled 
in bilingual programs (bilingual LEPs) in 1998, but not in 1999, and thus whose academic 
instruction was affected directly by Proposition 227. Did these former bilingual students' 
academic performance benefit or suffer from the reform? Individual-level data from one 
southern California school district show that the academic performance of former bilingual 
LEPs was not hurt by Proposition 227 relative to non-bilingual LEPs, that is, LEPs not 
enrolled in bilingual classes in 1998, and generally more proficient in English. My analysis 
shows that, before the reform, and controlling for background characteristics, bilingual LEPs 
had standardized scores 2.4 points less in reading and 0.5 more in math (on a scale from 1 to 
99) than non-bilingual LEP students. After Proposition 227, when former bilingual students 
were placed in English-only classrooms with special support, their scores were never worse 
than those of non-bilingual LEPs in reading and were still 0.5 higher in math. In summary, 
former bilingual LEPs caught up with non-bilingual LEPs. 
Methodologically, I use a multivariate specification with a selection process to take into 
consideration the fact that students with weak English skills, such as bilingual LEPs, are 
often exempted from taking tests in English. This common, yet often ignored, problem in 
educational program assessments can provide inconsistent and biased estimates. l Further-
more, to check the generalizability of the individual-level, single-district results, I examine 
county-level data. The aggregate analysis provides further evidence that Proposition 227 is 
not hurting LEP students' academic performance. 
These findings have important implications. From a policy perspective, they provide 
evidence consistent with a conclusion that bilingual education is not a superior program 
lSee Bohte and Meier (2000) for an account of schools' incentives to exempt students from testing and 
Rossell (1999) for problems regarding program comparisons when there is test exemption. 
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of instruction for LEPs. The efficacy of bilingual instruction has been, surprisingly, a long-
standing controversy for researchers and practitioners (Greene 1998; Rossell and Baker 1996). 
However, the present analysis is a short-term analysis, and long-term, multi-district assess-
ments (including districts that kept bilingual classes) are needed. More broadly, the positive 
effects of the reform suggest that dismantling or shortening bilingual programs may intro-
duce more equality in educational outcomes. The impact of the reform after one year is 
small, but positive, helping reduce the test-score gap between LEPs and non-LEPs and 
also, perhaps more importantly, between Hispanics and whites. Reducing the especially 
large Hispanic-white test gap is of concern given the linkages between English proficiency, 
educational attainment and labor market success (Kossoudji 1988; Lopez and Mora 1998). 
From a political perspective, my results are unexpected given recent interpretations of 
state policies and race. According to theories of ethnic group and racial competition, states 
with large minority and large white non-ethnic populations, such as California, are more 
likely to adopt policies that are detrimental to minorities' interests (Giles and Evans 1986; 
Hero and Tolbert 1996).2 While many viewed Proposition 227 as targeting Hispanics neg-
atively, my findings suggest that Proposition 227 has not been detrimental to them so far. 
Regarding education policy specifically, Meier and Stewart (1992) stress its political aspects 
and contend that increases in Hispanic representation and political clout will produce edu-
cation policy that will benefit Hispanics. Proposition 227 seems to have benefited Hispanics 
despite the fact that it was promoted by a non-Hispanic, conservative citizen group. 
Policymakers, educators, and politicians in many states are watching California's expe-
rience with Proposition 227 closely. Positive educational outcomes from an innovation can 
encourage policy entrepreneurs to disseminate it across the states (Mintrom and Vergari 
1998; Walker 1981). In fact, Arizona's voters passed a measure identical to Proposition 227 
in November 2000, greatly aided by policy advocates from California. 
2Consider the examples in California of Proposition 187 that denied social services to illegal immigrants 
and Proposition 209 that ended affirmative action programs. 
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5.2 The Passage of Proposition 227 
Proposition 227, sponsored by English for the Children, a conservative citizen organization, 
passed in every California county except San Francisco and Alameda. The level of voter 
approval surprised observers, given that many teacher unions and Hispanic organizations 
had mobilized strongly against Proposition 227 (Cornelius and Martinez 1999). However, 
voter approval does not imply an informed consensus on the merits of bilingual instruction. In 
an exit poll analysis of voters, Alvarez (1999) shows that racial and ideological identifications 
were the driving factors for the passage of Proposition 227, independent of opinions on the 
efficacy of bilingual instruction. 
Bilingual education is a racially and ideologically charged issue for voters, and it is also 
controversial for researchers. 3 Scholars are not in consensus on the effects of bilingual pro-
grams. This lack of consensus sterns from ideological biases, problematic methodology, and 
simple intellectual disagreement. Reviewing 72 methodologically acceptable studies from a 
pool of 300 studies (including unpublished studies), Rossell and Baker (1996) find no evidence 
that bilingual education is better for LEP students than English-as-a-second-Language (ESL) 
programs or structured-English-immersion programs (SEI). Only in a minority of studies was 
bilingual instruction found to be better than regular all-English classroom instruction. 
On the other hand, some researchers have concluded that bilingual programs can be 
at least as effective as English-only ones, and sometimes even more effective (Collier 1992; 
Collier and Thomas 1989; Garcia 1991; Greene 1998; Krashen 1996, 1999; Ramirez 1992; 
Willig 1985). For example, Ramirez and his associates (1992), who tracked students over 
four years in various programs of instruction for LEP students, found that bilingual pro-
grams of short duration were better than immersion programs, but only in the early years. 
Importantly though, the Ramirez study did not account for the fact that proportionally 
fewer bilingual students were tested (29 percent) than those tested in other programs (42 
percent). Since only the better performing bilingual students get tested for the bilingual 
programs in this study, his results could be biased toward showing better educational effects 
3For a history of bilingual education, see Crawford 1995. For program description, see Faltis and Hudelson 
1998. 
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for these programs (Rossell 1999). 
Before Proposition 227, there was no broad agreement among voters, teachers or aca-
demics about the potential effects of the initiative. After the public release of 1999 aggregate 
school-level data that showed small increases in test scores, the reactions were mixed. Those 
who advocated bilingual instruction cautioned against ignoring across-the-board increases 
when looking at LEPs' improvements (Bakuta 1999). Others compared school districts that 
complied with Proposition 227's mandate thoroughly and those that maintained bilingual 
programs and concluded that the initiative had worked in improving scores (Clark 1999) 
but had a minimal impact on the redesignation rates of LEPs (Lopez 2000). The follow-
ing sections of this article focus on using individual-level data to control for background 
characteristics and the test-exemption bias to help determine the real impact of Proposition 
227. 
5.3 Dismantling Bilingual Programs and Student Per-
formance 
The main question is what impact Proposition 227 had on the academic performances of 
former bilingual LEPs compared to non-bilingual LEPs. To answer this question, I exam-
ine test scores before and after the reform. Before the reform, students enrolled in bilingual 
classes in 1998 should have lower test scores than non-bilingual LEPs since bilingual students 
had less exposure to English and all tests were conducted in English. If full fluency takes 
more than five years, as some studies suggest (Collier and Thomas 1989; National Research 
Council 1998), and tests in English do not accurately reflect English learner's knowledge, 
then bilingual LEPs' scores should be lower than non-bilingual LEPs. Mean 1998 state-level 
reading and math test scores of bilingual LEPs compared to all LEPs provide evidence of 
bilingual students lagging non-bilingual LEPs prior to Proposition 227 (California Depart-
ment of Education, 2001). 
What effects could a reform like Proposition 227 have on students' performance after 
only one year? The impact of Proposition 227 could be negative on bilingual students if: 
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1) interrupting bilingual instruction and suddenly immersing students in English classrooms 
is disruptive (Ramirez 1992; Fillmore 1998), 2) interrupting any program of instruction, 
regardless of its merits, is educationally disruptive, or 3) bilingual instruction is a superior 
program (Krashen 1996; Ramirez 1992; Willig 1985). The impact of Proposition 227 could 
be posi ti ve in the first year if: 1) bilingual instruction is not a superior form of instruction 
compared to English-only instruction such as ESL, SEI or regular English instruction (Rossell 
and Baker 1996), 2) bilingual instruction is superior to English-only programs, but when 
carried out poorly interrupting it is beneficial, or 3) bilingual instruction is superior, but 
only in the long-run, after proficiency has been achieved, thus rendering any initial benefits 
of the reform short-lived (Hakuta, 2000; Krashen 1996, 1999). 
Thus, with all these logical possibilities for the impact of Proposition 227, assessing 
its effects in the short-term does not provide a clear-cut test on the efficacy of bilingual 
instruction since, strictly speaking, other explanations not hinging on efficacy may be driving 
the results. However, if the bilingual program studied had been well implemented, and the 
impact of the reform is positive after one year, this will be suggestive evidence that bilingual 
instruction is not beneficial for LEPs. An assessment of the reform after several years will 
provide more definitive answers. 
Ideally, we would also compare the performance of former bilingual LEPs with continu-
ing bilingual LEPs, in addition to continuing non-bilingual LEPs. This comparison would 
hold constant their 1998 bilingual background while varying their 1999 status. However, in 
the southern California district under study, this is not possible since the district essentially 
dismantled its bilingual program. Only 200 bilingual students continued in bilingual instruc-
tion and they were all exempted from test taking in 1999. Therefore, I only compare former 
bilingual students and non-bilingual students. 4 
4Since continuing bilingual students are not included in this study, I will refer to former bilingual LEP 
students as bilingual LEPs when the context is clear. Similarly, I will refer to continuing non-bilingual LEPs 
as non-bilingual LEPs. 
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5.4 Data and Methods 
504.1 The District 
Pasadena Unified School District (PUSD) is in Los Angeles county. In 1998-99 it had a 
total population of approximately 22,000 students, of whom 18,300 were eligible to take 
California's yearly mandatory academic tests. As seen in Table 1, the percentage of LEPs in 
Pasadena (26.3 percent) is very close to the overall state figure of 24.6 percent. Pasadena's 
academic performance in reading, on the other hand, lagged California's in every grade. With 
its large Hispanic and LEP student body, PUSD is representative of California's urban school 
districts and a good candidate for a study of the effects of Proposition 227. However, the fact 
that it has a more disadvantaged and diverse student body, as seen by the variables percent 
Hispanic, percent black, percent in the California Work Opportunity and Responsibility to 
Kids (CalWORKs) program, formerly Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 
and percent free lunch, may make it more difficult for any reform to succeed. 
[Table 1 about here]. 
In 1998, there were approximately 5,400 LEP students in the PUSD, with 2,900 of these, 
or 16 percent of the student population, were enrolled in bilingual classes, primarily in 
grades K-4.5 Bilingual instruction in PUSD was a deliberate program. The average stay 
in bilingual classes for LEPs was four years while close to 20 percent of the teachers had 
bilingual accreditations. By comparison, Los Angeles county had only 15 percent of its 
teachers accredited in bilingual education despite having a higher percentage of LEPs (33 
percent) than did PUSD (28 percent). But by 1999, after the passage of Proposition 227, 
PUSD had largely dismantled its bilingual programs. The majority of the bilingual students 
were placed in structurcd-English-immersion classes (SEI) where English was taught at the 
students' level, or in classrooms with some English support. Approximately 200 waivers, all 
from the most heavily Hispanic school, were requested by parents to keep their children in 
bilingual classes. The district went from roughly two-thirds of its 30 schools offering bilingual 
programs in 1998 to just one school in 1999. 
50ver 97 percent of students in bilingual education had Spanish as their primary language. 
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5.4.2 The Data 
To test the impact of Proposition 227, I use a multivariate linear specification with a Heckman 
selection process. Details of this model are in the next section and in Appendix A. The 
dependent variable measuring the performance of students is test score, and the explanatory 
variables reflect students' background and school information. 6 The test scores are from 1998 
and 1999 Stanford 9 tests (on a scale from 1 to 99) that all California students in grades 
2-11 are required by law to take. I will focus the present analysis on total reading and math, 
which are tested at all grade levels. 7 
The set of students in the main analysis includes: 1) students who were exempted from 
test-taking in 1998, but not in 1999 and were in the district both years, and 2) students who 
took the tests both years and were in the district both years. That is, the students excluded 
arc those who left in 1999, were new in 1999, or were exempted from test-taking in both 
years. In PUSD, this latter excluded group consisted in great part of the 200 or so students 
who continued in bilingual classes after the reform and all attended the same school. 
The independent variables incorporated in the analysis can be grouped into three cate-
gories: individual, group, and school variables. The individual variables describe a student's 
English proficiency classification: LEP and bilingual LEP. A LEP student is a child from a 
non-English speaking family who scores low in an English assessment test. A bilingual LEP 
student is a LEP student enrolled in bilingual classes in 1998. 8 LEP students tend to score 
significantly lower than non-LEPs in reading and math, and I expect to see this gap in the 
Pasadena district (National Research Council, 1998). 
The group variables are race (Hispanic, black, white, other), socioeconomic level (high 
SES, mid-SES, low SES), family receipt of welfare (AFDC/CalWORKs), free lunch pro-
gram (free lunch), and legal guardianship at home (both parents, mother, father, fos-
GThe data (proprietary to PUSD) was provided by the Testing, Research and Evaluation Center at PUSD. 
7The test scores are normed curve equivalent (NCE) scores. They are obtained by first scaling the scores 
according to the difficulty of the questions. Next, these scaled scores are translated into a national percentile 
rank (NPR), which is the percentage of the national norming sample that scored equal to or less than the 
student. Finally, the NPR is re-expressed as a value from (1 to 99) in a normal curve with mean 50. The 
benefit from using NCE scores is that comparisons can be made across subjects and grades. 
8Standardized evaluations of LEP students are problematic in that not only do districts have different 
criteria but, given a certain criteria, even native English-speaking students may not pass them (Rossell 2000). 
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ter/institution). Socioeconomic levels are derived from the real estate value of a student's res-
idence address. AFDC/CalWORKs is welfare for families with children and the free/reduced 
lunch program is a need-based federally-funded program. Legal guardianship can be held 
by both parents, the mother, the father or other (foster, institution, step-parents, etc.). In 
general, Imver SES and welfare variables are expected to be associated with lower scores 
(Hallushek 1986; J\1urnane 1975), while relatively more stable households composed of both 
parents are expected to have a small positive effect on scores (McLanahan and Sandefur 
1994). In regard to race, ample research has documented the gap in education test scores 
between African-American and Hispanic students with respect to white students (Jencks and 
Philli ps 1998). 
The school variables are class size, percent full credentials, magnet school and percent 
teacher Hispanic. Class size is the average class size of a school, and percent full credentials 
is the percent of credentials held by school staff that are full (as opposed to emergency 
or interim) credentials. Magnet school is an indicator for the three magnet schools in the 
district. The evidence on class size has been mixed, with some scholars finding no effect 
(Hanushek 1999) and others finding a positive effect (Pate-Bain et a1. 1992). I expect higher 
percentages of full credentials to be associated with higher scores (Darling-Hammond 2000; 
Fetler 1999). The percentage of teachers of Hispanic origin may have an impact on the 
probability of being exempted from test-taking, a problem discussed next. 
5.4.3 Methods 
To assess the independent impact of Proposition 227, we need to control for students' back-
ground characteristics since the assignment into a bilingual class was not random. 9 Bilingual 
LEPs were not only less proficient in English than non-bilingual LEPs, but they also tended 
to belong to more disadvantaged families. In addition, out of a total of the 14,000 students 
enrolled in the district in both years, more than 1,000 were exempted from taking the tests, 
and close to 1,000 other students simply skipped the reading and math tests.lO If the exemp-
9The assignment of LEP students into bilingual classes was the result of the district's assessment through 
tests and subsequent recommendations from the Bilingual Center at PUSD to the parents. 
lOIn the data set the students who were exempted or missed are indistinguishable. 
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tions and misses were correlated with students' test scores, the underlying selection processes 
must be taken into account, otherwise the estimates will be biased and inconsistent (Greene 
1993, 709). 
I use Heckman's (1979) selection model to account for the selection process. In this 
model, two equations are estimated. The first equation, the one of interest, explains test 
scores. Without a selection process, this equation could be estimated by standard ordinary 
least squares (OL8) techniques. The second equation, the selection equation, uses a discrete 
binary model to explain whether a score is observed. In Heckman's model, the coefficients 
and parameters in both equations are estimated simultaneously through maximizing the 
likelihood of observing the data (Greene 1993, 706-711; Heckman 1979; Maddala 1996, 258-
267). An important parameter that is estimated is the correlation, p, between the errors 
(the non-deterministic components) in the two equations. If the correlation is statistically 
different from zero, this implies the two processes, scores and test-taking, are interdependent 
and the selection model is appropriate (see Appendix A for more details on the model). For 
example, a positive p being positive implies that students more likely to take the tests are 
also more likely to have higher scores. 
5.5 Before and After Proposition 227 
I begin the analysis by looking at the average scores before and after Proposition 227, without 
controlling for background information. Table 2 presents the average reading and math test 
scores for 1998 and 1999, according to a student's English program classification. From 1998 
to 1999, bilingual LEP students increased their average scores by 4.4 points in reading and 
4.0 points in math. Students in the early grades (not disaggregated in Table 2) accounted 
for most of these increases. Non-bilingual LEPs, on the other hand, experienced smaller 
increases of 1.5 points and 2.5 in reading and math, respectively. Bilingual LEPs' 1999 scores 
in reading and math were statistically indistinguishable (at the 95 percent level) from those 
of non-bilingual LEPs in a difference of means test. Non-LEP students have much higher 
average scores than either bilingual or non-bilingual LEPs, but their average gains are much 
smaller: 0.7 points in reading and 1.2 in math. This preliminary breakdown suggests that 
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bilingual LEP students may have caught up to non-bilingual LEP students' performance after 
Proposition 227. However, these numbers do not include statistical controls for background, 
nor do they account for the fact that many bilingual students did not take the tests in 1998. 
The next section addresses these issues. 
[Table 2 about here]. 
5.5.1 The Baseline in 1998 
I use the Heckman specification to compare the 1998 scores of bilingual LEPs and non-
bilingual LEPs, taking into account background characteristics and test-exemption biases. 
Table 3 presents the complete selection model results for 1998 reading and math scores in 
PUSD. Almost all of the coefficients in the scores and selection equations are statistically 
different from zero at the 95 percent levelY The parameter, p, is 0.87 and 0.79 for reading 
and math, respectively. These values are large and statistically significant at the 95% level, 
justifying the use of the selection model. The positive p implies that the better achieving 
students were being tested. Furthermore, the coefficients from the test-taking equation 
imply that being a bilingual LEP, LEP, Hispanic, black or belonging to a school with a 
large percentage of Hispanic teachers significantly decreases a student's chances of taking 
the tests. 
[Table 3 about here]. 
Consider the coefficients of the background and school variables appearing only in the 
scores equation. These can be interpreted directly as in an OLS model. In general, all of these 
coefficients are in the expected direction. For example, all else being equal, students with low 
SES backgrounds have lower scores in reading (-3.25) and math (-3.38) than students from 
high SES backgrounds. Having both parents in the family, on the other hand, is associated 
with higher scores in reading (2.46) and math (3.15) compared to students living with foster 
parents or in an institution. 
With regard to school variables, which policymakers may influence more directly than 
students' SES characteristics, I find that the percentage of full credentials has a positive 
11 If only the scores equation for reading is estimated with OLS, the R2 is 0.35 and a pro bit estimate of 
the test-taking equation has a pseudo-R2 of 0.22. These suggest a reasonable fit of the models to the data. 
99 
and statistically significant effect on reading and math scores. Increasing the percentage of 
full credentials in a school from 65 percent, close to the district's average, to 100 percent 
increases the predicted scores in reading and math by 7 points. This is a large effect when 
we consider, for example, that the performance increases ascribed to the recently touted 
reductions in class size are only about 3 points (Los Angeles Times, 1999). The impact 
of the class size variable is small, but surprisingly it is positive, possibly due to the fact 
that schools with more students in their classrooms are more likely to exempt students from 
taking tests. 12 
Next, consider the impact of the LEP and bilingual LEP variables on 1998 test scores. 
These variables appear in both the score and test-taking equations. Their total marginal 
effect equals their effect in the scores equation plus their effect in the selection equation, 
with a correction weighted by the correlation estimate, p (Appendix B). Table 4 summarizes 
these total impacts. The net effect is that a LEP student enrolled in bilingual instruction 
in 1998 scored 2.4 points less in reading than a non-bilingual LEP, and 0.5 points more 
in math. These effects are statistically significant at the 95 percent level and confirm our 
initial expectations. Bilingual students enrolled in 1998 had statistically lower scores than 
non-bilingual LEPs in subjects that stress English skills. 
[Table 4 about here]. 
This lag in reading between bilingual LEPs and non-bilingual LEPs in 1998 is meaningful 
in educational terms. Its size is comparable to the effect of California's class size reform. In 
terms of the implications of this lag, the fact that bilingual LEPs did worse in reading than 
non-bilingual LEP students while they did virtually the same in math suggests the lack of 
exposure to English may have impacted bilingual students' scores. 
Among all the predictors, the LEP variable has the largest effect. As might be expected, 
LEP students on average have much lower scores than non-LEP students. When we combine 
the effects of the LEP variable from both the scores and the selection equations, a repre-
sentative LEP student (Hispanic and non-bilingual) scores 13.1 points less than a non-LEP 
student in reading and 9.7 less in math. These gaps are statistically significant and substan-
tively large. Furthermore, race has an impact on scores even after language and background 
12The correlation between having a reading test score in 1998 and class size is 0.24, for example. 
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controls. All else equal, Hispanic students score close to 6.3 and 7.3 points less in reading 
and math, respectively, than white students. For black students, the gap with respect to 
white students is even larger: 9.8 points in reading and 11.9 points in math. My analysis 
does not include other controls, such as parent's education and at-home behavior, which 
might reduce the gaps among these racial groups. On the other hand, these large gaps are 
consistent with many findings in the literature. 13 
5.6 Good News after Proposition 227? 
The primary goal of this chapter is to assess the impact of Proposition 227 on LEP students. 
Many bilingual students had their educational program interrupted by the proposition, es-
pecially students entering second or third grade in 1999 given that the average stay m 
bilingual programs was four years. In 1999, most bilingual LEP students were placed m 
structured-English-immersion classrooms. What happened to these former bilingual LEPs 
after Proposition 2277 I find that in the first year after the Proposition 227 former bilingual 
LEP students caught up with non-bilingual LEPs, especially in reading. 
[Table 5 about here]. 
Table 5 presents the estimates from a Heckman selection model where students' 1999 
scores in reading and math are explained by the same independent variables included in 
the 1998 estimation. The correlation estimate, p, is positive and statistically significant for 
reading but negative (though small) and significant for math. The latter may reflect the 
fact that students missing math tests are more likely to be those who skipped tests rather 
than exempted students. Except for the variable indicating enrollment in bilingual classes 
in 1998, we would not expect the independent variables to have different effects in 1998 and 
1999, and indeed, the coefficients are of the same magnitude and direction in both years. 
The exception is the coefficient for class size which is positive in 1998 and negative in 1999. 
However, in both years, the impact is substantively minimal (only about 1.5 points for a 
decrease of about ten students). 
13See Jencks and Phillips (1998) for a thorough account of the test-score gap between black and white, 
and the National Center for Education Statistics Report 767 (1995) with regard to the gap between Hispanic 
and white students. 
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Table 6 summarizes the total effects of the variables of interest, paralleling Table 4. After 
the reform, bilingual LEPs had scores in reading only 0.37 points less than non-bilingual 
LEPs, a difference that was not statistically significant. That is, bilingual LEPs' scores in 
reading were statistically indistinguishable from non-bilingual LEPs. Likewise for math, the 
total effect of 0.49 points from having been enrolled in bilingual classes is not statistically 
different from zero. Bilingual LEPs appear to have caught up with non-bilingual LEPs in 
a single year. The fact that the scores of non-bilingual LEPs and non-LEPs also went up 
implies that the gap bet\veen bilingual LEPs and non-bilingual LEPs is not due merely to 
the top performing students doing worse. Rather, it seems the lowest performing students 
improved. Therefore, we can confirm the hypothesis that Proposition 227 seems to have 
had a positive effect after one year. The gap in scores between bilingual LEP students and 
non-bilingual LEP students decreased in 1999. 
(Table 6 about here). 
Another way to assess the impact of the reform is to look at the gains experienced 
by individual students. A preliminary inspection shows that in reading bilingual students 
experienced greater gains (4.1 points) than non-bilingual students (1.8 points), and non-LEPs 
(1.0 points). The differences between each of the groups' means are statistically significant. 
Analyzing the gains with a Heckman model (Sec Appendix C.1 and C.2) shows that bilingual 
LEPs increased their reading scores an average of 1.1 more than non-bilingual LEPs', while 
in math there was no difference in the gains between bilingual and non-bilingual LEPs. So, 
who experienced these gains? Further inspection with a multivariate analysis (see Appendix 
C.3) shows that most of the gains experienced by bilingual LEPs (and, in fact, for all students 
in general) occurred in the early grades. Former bilingual LEPs in third grade in 1999, who 
experienced two years of bilingual instruction, had gains in reading, after proper controls, 
of close to 4 points. This may leave open the possibility that short periods of bilingual 
instruction (no longer than two years) may not be detrimental to English learners (Bali 
2001). 
The immediate policy implication of these findings is that immersing bilingual students 
in English-based classrooms did not set them back relative to non-bilingual LEP students, at 
least in the short run. The implication for theories of language acquisition is that abruptly 
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interrupting bilingual classes is not detrimental to students (Ramirez 1992; Wong Fillmore 
1998). With regards to bilingual education's efficacy, a positive effect is consistent with 
bilingual programs not being effective compared to English-only ones (Rossell and Baker 
1996). However, these effects may be short-lived and district-dependent, and further research 
across districts, and over time are needed to provide final answers. Perhaps more importantly, 
LEPs and Hispanic students still have much lower scores than non-LEPs and whites, even 
after Proposition 227. Other policy reforms, such as more emphasis on teacher training and 
credentialing should also be considered as ways to reduce this gap. 
5.7 Robustness and Model Specification 
In this section I test the robustness of my findings to plausible changes in the model used, 
the students studied, and the data analyzed. 
Selection Model versus OLS. If a standard ordinary least squares model is used to 
predict 1998 test scores, rather that the selection model estimated in Table 3, bilingual LEPs 
score 1.8 points less in reading and 0.73 points more in math than non-bilingual LEPs (p-
values are 0.005 and 0.287, respectively). These numbers imply a smaller gap between the 
two groups than those obtained earlier with the selection model. That is, not accounting for 
the possibility that the weaker bilingual students were being exempted and therefore using an 
incorrect model specification, underestimates the gap in reading test scores between bilingual 
and non-bilingual LEPs and subsequently underestimates the effect of Proposition 227. 
Stable Population of Students Bias. My analysis includes only students who \vere 
in the district in both 1998 and 1999, before and after Proposition 227. The rationale was 
that this would hold the general district-\vide impact constant. Bilingual students arriving 
in Pasadena in 1999 may have had very different experiences in their bilingual instruction, 
complicating the comparisons with non-bilingual LEPs. However, this research design choice 
may induce bias. The direction of this bias is not clear, since while anecdotal accounts often 
suggest low income students are highly mobile, my data suggests otherwise. Students who 
left PUSD in 1998 had statistically the same likelihood of being LEP and of being at the 
same mean SES level as those who stayed. Moreover, the percentage of white students who 
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left was slightly higher (significant at the 95 percent level) than those who stayed. Most 
importantly, however, repeating the analysis done in this article, without a restriction on 
enrollment for t\VO consecutive years yields the same qualitative results. In 1999, bilingual 
LEPs scored indistinguishably from non-bilingual LEPs in reading and math tests. 
Boundary constraints. The data present some heteroskedasticity due to boundary 
effects. That is, larger errors occur in the estimation when predicting tests scores close 
to the boundaries 1 and 99. All estimations were done without including robust standard 
errors to minimize the chances of incorrectly concluding a variable had significant effects. To 
check that boundary effects are not skewing these results I reanalyze the data with a probit 
analysis coding one for test scores abov(~ 25 and 0 otherwise (25 is close to the mean score 
for LEPs in general). I find that bilingual LEP students were 6 percent more likely to score 
below the threshold in 1998 than non-bilingual LEPs (p-value i 0.05) while in 1999 they were 
1 percent more likely to score above the threshold than non-bilingual LEPs but this effect is 
not significant (p-value = 0.34). Therefore, the analysis with a discrete dependent variable 
obtains the same qualitative results as the analysis with a continuous one. 
5.8 County Level Results 
So far, I have analyzed only data from PUSD, a district that I consider representative of 
California's urban districts. To assess the generalizability of my results, I checked whether 
they would hold at a more general level of analysis. I analyzed count level data for California 
in 1998 and 1999, including all tests-takers in both years. Using an OLS model, the dependent 
variable was the test score change experienced by each county as measured by the difference 
III the percentage of students scoring above the 50th National Percentile Ranking (NPR) 
III 1999 versus 1998.14 The independent variables for the analysis are the percentages for 
demographic and school related factors already discussed in the individual level analysis: 
bilingual LEP 1998, Hispanic, black, white, AFDC, free lunch, LEP and the percentage of 
full credentials. I also included the predicted residuals from a test-taking equation (again, 
14For example, Los Angeles county had 35 percent of students scoring above the 50th NPR in 1999 while 
in 1998 they had only 32 percent. Thus, Los Angeles county experienced a gain of 3 percentage points. 
104 
as in the individual level case) to account for test taking biases. 15 The results are presented 
in Table 7. The standard caveats for any aggregate analysis of educational data hold in this 
case; there can be multicollinearity among variables, there is the possibility of committing 
ecological fallacies, and hierarchical models may be more appropriate (Gill 2000; Draper 
1995). I view this aggregate analysis merely as a check of the generalizability of the previously 
observed results. 
[Table 7 about here]. 
The R2 of the OLS model is 0.46 for reading and 0.5 for math. The only coefficients 
that are (close) to significant at the 90 percent level are percent percent black, percent full 
credentials and the predicted test-taking residuals. The estimated coefficients on percent 
Hispanic and percent Bilingual LEP are not significant at the 90 percent level for reading 
and math. The coefficient on the predicted test-taking residual is positive and significant 
suggesting that counties with larger proportions of test-takers had higher gains above the 
national median. These results are consistent with Proposition 227 not hurting the edu-
cational performance of Hispanic students, although a more definitive test would compare 
gains from other years, for example 1997 to 1998, to those experienced from 1998 to 1999. 
But since legally mandated, systematic testing only began in 1998, this comparison cannot 
be made. 
5.9 Discussion 
Bilingual education has been a controversial, yet popular, program of instruction for English 
learners. The increasing size of the immigrant population, especially that of Hispanic origin, 
and the persistent gap in educational outcomes between Hispanic and white students, re-
quires that the effectiveness of bilingual programs be evaluated, and perhaps that improved 
ways of educating English learners be developed. Through political circumstances, Cali-
fornia's experience with Proposition 227 allowed for a natural experiment of the effects of 
bilingual education. The results after one year of the reform have shed some light on the 
15The predicted residuals were obtained by regressing the percent of students who took the tests in each 
county over county-level demographics and the percent of Hispanic teachers. 
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controversy. Dismantling bilingual programs seems to have provided a small improvement 
towards equalizing educational outcomes between Hispanic and white students. 
Before Proposition 227, bilingual LEP students from the one southern California school 
district studied here had lower scores in reading than non-bilingual LEP students. One 
year later, these former bilingual students had reading scores that were indistinguishable 
from those of their non-bilingual LEP peers, students who in principle already had a better 
command of English. Since non-bilingual LEP students had better scores before Proposition 
227, I conclude that interrupting bilingual students' length of stay in bilingual programs did 
not set them back relative to non-bilingual LEP students, at least in the short run. Long-
term effect analysis, four of five years down the road, will provide more definitive answers. 
It is important to note that the present analysis has found only that interrupting bilingual 
instruction does not set bilingual students back. It provides evidence suggestive that bilingual 
instruction, as conducted in PUSD with an average stay of four years, is not a superior 
program of instruction compared to English-based programs. However, a successful program 
for English learners may still include" small doses" of bilingual instruction, especially in the 
early grades (Rossell and Baker 1996). Moreover, after Proposition 227 LEP students still 
vastly under-performed on reading and math tests compared to students fluent in English. 
Other policy factors apart from programs for English learning, such as teacher credentialing 
and training, may also affect student performance and should be addressed vigorously. 
From a political perspective, the passage and positive impact of Proposition 227 will likely 
lead to similar measures in other states. For example, Arizona passed a similar measure in 
the 2000 general election. Interestingly, the diffusion of this policy does not just mean the 
dismantling of bilingual programs but also the setting of a uniform standard within a state 
that adopts it. Standardization and accountability together with school choice have become 
the common responses of state governments and initiative groups to the recent educational 
concerns of voters (Mintrom and Vergari 1998; Ravitch 2000). 
The success of Proposition 227 in enhancing student performance points out a paradox of 
politics and policy. This initiative, proposed by a conservative citizen group, was viewed by 
many as having anti-immigrant, anti-Hispanic undertones, especially coming as it did after 
several initiatives in California that targeted public services for minorities and immigrants 
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directly. Despite its alleged anti-immigrant connotations, the reform was not detrimental and 
may have even benefited those it targeted. The policy success of this controversial measure 
may further encourage comprehensive educational reforms to be carried out through the 
initiative process rather than through the legislatures or state-level departments, expanding 
role of the initiative process in education. 
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5.10 Appendix A: Heckman's Selection Model and Marginal 
Effects 
Following Greene's notation (1993, 707-709) Heckman's selection model can be summarized 
as follows. Consider two equations, one for the selection model and the other for test scores. 
The variable, z, indicates \vhether a student took a test or not and takes on the values 1 
or 0 while, y is test scores. The independent variables w, and, x, arc individual and school 
characteristics. 
%i= g Wi+ Ui Selection (test-taking) equation 
Yi = f3 Xi + ei Scores equation 
Assume (Ui' ei ) is distributed bivariate normally [0, 0, 1, (Je, pl. For an observed Yi we 
have 
E [Yi I Yi is observed] = E [ Yi I Zi > 0 ] 
= f3 Xi + E lei lUi> - I Wi] 
= f3 Xi + P (Je m(o:u ) 
where, 
(\e u = - I \V i / (Ju 
Illi (0: 11 ) = ¢(o:) / <I>(o:) = Inverse Mills Ratio 
¢(.) is the density of a normal distribution and <I>(.) is the normal's cumulative density. 
The term, p (Je , is often referred to as lambda ().) in the econometric literature and is so 
denoted in Tables 3 and 6. The marginal effect for an indicator variable is then as follows 
E [ Yi I Zi > 0 , Xi = 1] - E [ Yi I Zi > 0 , Xi = 0] = {3 + P (Je m(xi = 1) - P (Je m(xi = 0) 
5.11 Appendix B: Total Marginal Effects for Reading 
Scores in Heckman Selection Model 
To calculate the total marginal effects, we first obtain m(xi = 1) - m(xi = 0), holding all 
other variables at their mean or modal values, as appropriate. Given that most individual-
level explanatory variables in this article are indicator variables, I usc modal values. The 
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calculation of the marginal effect for the variables of interest when explaining reading scores 
in PUSD in 1998 is for Table 4: 
Total Effect = Scores' Equation Effect + Selection Effect 
= f3 + P (Je . [m(xi = 1) - m(xi= 0)] 
Total Effect Bilingual LEP 1998 = -9.2 + 15.8 [0.65 -0.22] = -2.4 (1) 
Total Effect LEP 1998 = -14.7 + 15.8 [0.22 - 0.12] = -13.1 (2) 
Total Effect Hispanic = -7.28 + 15.8 [0.12 - 0.065] = -6.3 (3) 
Total Effect Black = -11.06 + 15.8 [0.14 - 0.065] = -9.8 (4) 
In (1), the difference in the Mill's ratios was obtained with regards to a Hispanic LEP 
student who went from non-bilingual to bilingual while all other variables in the selection 
equation were set at their modes. For (2), the effect is calculated for a Hispanic student not 
enrolled in bilingual classes, while for (3), the effect was calculated for a LEP student, not 
bilingual. The calculation for the predicted effects on math scores in 1998 (Table 4) and 
reading and math scores in 1999 (Table 6) follow the same logic. 
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Table 1. Pasadena Unified School District Compared to California, 1999 
PUSD California 
Total Students 18,300 5,844,110 
Percent Hispanic 47.6 41.3 
Percent Black 31.5 8.7 
Percent White 16.6 37.8 
Percent Other 4.3 12.2 
Percent LEP 26.3 24.6 
Percent AFDC 23 18.3 
Percent Free Lunch 67 47.7 
National Percentile Ranking Reading 2nd G a 40 43 
National Percentile Ranking Reading 11 th G a 29 36 
Source: California's Department of Education Website, http://www.cde.ca.gov and PUSD. 
a National Percentile Ranking from Stanford 9 Tests in a scale from 1 to 99. 
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Table 2. Average 1998 and 1999 Stanford 9 Test Scores in Reading and Math 
for PUSD Students, by English Proficiency and Program Enrollment 
Bilingual LEP in 1998 Non-Bilingual LEP in 1998 Non-LEP in 1998 
Reading 1998 27.6 (1192, 14.62) 31 (1765, 14.8) 46 (8870,19.48) 
Reading 1999 32 (2205, 15.11) 32.5 (1906, 14.9) 46.7 (9205,19.44) 
Gains Reading 4.15 (1148,11.08) 1.8 (1691,11.5) 1.02 (8503, 11.5) 
Math 1998 37.8 (1225,18.35) 38.3 (1833,16.8) 48.9 (9032, 20.8) 
Math1999 41.8 (2269, 18.7) 40.8 (1933, 16.9) 50.2 (9349, 20.9) 
Gains Math 2.56 (1208, 14.3) 2.53 (1780, 13.5) 1.48 (8773, 13.9) 
Source: Test scores and student classification were made available by PUSD's Testing Department. 
Note: Average scores are for test-takers in the district in 1998 and 1999. The number of students and 
the standard deviation of the test scores are included in parentheses. 
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Table 3. Heckman Selection Model Predicting 1998 Reading and Math Test Scores in PUSD 
Reading Math 
Coefficient Standard P-value Coefficient Standard P-value 
Error Error 
Scores Model 
Bilingual LEP 1998 -9.22 0.70 0.00 -7.32 0.78 0.00 
LEP 1998 -14.73 0.52 0.00 -10.36 0.55 0.00 
Hispanic -7.29 0.52 0.00 -8.09 0.55 0.00 
Black -11.06 0.52 0.00 -12.87 0.55 0.00 
Other (Non-white) 1.41 0.80 0.08 4.21 0.87 0.00 
Male -2.35 0.29 0.00 0.13 0.32 0.69 
Low SES -3.25 0.67 0.00 -3.38 0.74 0.00 
Mid SES -0.97 0.65 0.14 -1.11 0.72 0.12 
AFDC -3.30 0.39 0.00 -3.47 0.43 0.00 
Free Lunch -5.54 0.39 0.00 -4.55 0.42 0.00 
Both Parents 2.46 0.52 0.00 3.15 0.57 0.00 
Mother 0.70 0.54 0.20 0.24 0.60 0.69 
Father 0.01 1.03 0.99 2.00 1.13 0.08 
Percent Full Credentials 0.20 0.02 0.00 0.22 0.02 0.00 
Class Size 0.22 0.06 0.00 0.16 0.07 0.02 
Magnet School 4.67 0.48 0.00 2.37 0.51 0.00 
Constant 25.67 2.73 0.00 29.01 2.97 0.00 
Selection Model 
Bilingual LEP 1998 -0.95 0.05 0.00 -1.25 0.05 0.00 
LEP 1998 -0.36 0.04 0.00 -0.19 0.05 0.00 
Hispanic -0.36 0.05 0.00 -0.37 0.05 0.00 
Black -0.44 0.05 0.00 -0.42 0.05 0.00 
Percent Teacher Hispanic -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
Magnet 0.26 0.05 0.00 0.12 0.05 0.03 
Constant 1.76 0.07 0.00 1.81 0.07 0.00 
Rho 0.87 0.01 0.79 0.02 
Lambda 15.86 0.34 15.34 0.49 
N 15979 15717 
Source: Student variables were provided by PUS D's Testing Department and school variables were obtained from 
the California Department of Education's website. 
Note: Dummy variables for each grade (excluding 11th grade) were included in both the scores and selection 
equations, and all levels were significant. Scores from the Stanford 9 tests are on a scale from 1 to 99. 
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Table 4. English Proficiency and Race Effects from Heckman Selection 
Model for Reading and Math Test Scores of PUSD Students, 1998 
Reading Math 
Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-valuc 
Bilingual LEP 1998 -2.4 < 0.05 0.5 < 0.05 
LEP 1998 -13.1 < 0.05 -9.7 < 0.05 
Hispanic -6.3 < 0.05 -7.3 < 0.05 
Black -9.8 < 0.05 -11.9 < 0.05 
Source: See source note for Table 3. 
Note: The excluded variables are non-LEP and white. That is, bilingual LEPs score in reading 
2.4 points less less than non-bilingual LEPs, and LEPS (bilingual and non-bilingual) score 
13.1 points less than non-LEPs. Hispanics and blacks score 6.3 and 9.8 points less than whites. 
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Table 5. Heckman Selection Model Predicting 1999 Reading and Math Test Scores 
Reading Math 
Coefficient Standard P-value Coefficient Standard P-value 
Error Error 
Scores Model 
Bilingual LEP 1998 -0.84 0.57 0.14 0.42 0.59 0.48 
LEP 1998 -l3.28 0.48 0.00 -9.42 0.51 0.00 
Hispanic -5.94 0.49 0.00 -6.79 0.52 0.00 
Black -10.40 0.49 0.00 -11.88 0.52 0.00 
Other (Non-White) 2.96 0.77 0.00 6.47 0.85 0.00 
Male -2.25 0.27 0.00 0.14 0.31 0.64 
Low SES -3.06 0.64 0.00 -2.62 0.72 0.00 
Mid SES -0.51 0.62 0.41 -0.99 0.71 0.16 
AFDC -3.30 0.37 0.00 -3.83 0.41 0.00 
Free Lunch -5.88 0.37 0.00 -4.75 0.42 0.00 
Both Parents 3.03 0.49 0.00 4.26 0.56 0.00 
Mother 0.95 0.51 0.06 1.04 0.58 0.08 
Father 0.96 0.98 0.33 1.69 1.12 0.l3 
Percent Full Credentials 0.16 0.02 0.00 0.21 0.02 0.00 
Class Size -0.16 0.06 0.01 -0.13 0.07 0.05 
Magnet School 5.57 0.45 0.00 0.98 0.48 0.04 
Constant 41.77 2.55 0.00 41.40 2.81 0.00 
Selection Model 
Bilingual LEP 1998 -0.14 0.07 0.03 0.l3 0.10 0.19 
LEP 1998 -0.14 0.06 0.01 -0.07 0.07 0.37 
Hispanic -0.35 0.06 0.00 -0.07 0.07 0.30 
Black -0.35 0.06 0.00 -0.10 0.07 0.15 
Percent Teacher Hispanic 0.00 0.00 0.93 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
Magnet 0.47 0.07 0.00 0.87 0.l3 0.00 
Constant 1.74 0.07 0.00 1.54 0.09 0.00 
Rho 0.89 0.01 -0.38 0.09 
Sigma 17.29 0.12 18.09 0.l3 
Lambda 15.42 0.30 -6.79 1.58 
N 14,508 14274 
Source: Student variables were provided by PUSD's Testing Department and school variables were 
obtained from California Department of Education's website, http:// www.cde.ca.gov and PUSD. 
Note: Dummy variables for each grade (excluding lith grade) were included in both the scores and selection 
equations, and all levels were significant. Scores from the Stanford 9 tests are on a scale from 1 to 99. 
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Table 6. English Proficiency and Race Effects from Heckman Selection 
Model for Reading and Math Test Scores of PUSD Students, 1999 
Reading Math 
Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Bilingual LEP 1998 -0.37 >0.2 0.49 >0.43 
LEP 1998 -12.8 <0.05 -9.4 >0.5 
Hispanic -5.4 <0.05 -6.8 >0.5 
Black -9.8 <0.05 -11.8 >0.5 
Source: See source note for Table 5. 
Note: The excluded variables are non-LEP and white. That is, bilingual LEPs score in reading 
0.37 points less less than non-bilingual LEPs, and LEPS (bilingual and non-bilingual) score 
12.8 points less than non-LEPs. Hispanics and blacks score 5.4 and 9.8 points less than whites. 
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Table 7. OLS Model Predicting County-Level Gains in Percent of Students Scoring 
Above the 50th NPR in Reading and Math Test Scores in California, 1998-1999 
Reading Math 
Coefficient SE P-value Coefficient SE P-value 
Percent Bilingual 1998 -0.01 0.01 0.16 -0.01 0.01 0.55 
Percent Hispanic 0.01 0.02 0.73 0.01 0.02 0.79 
Percent Black 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.06 
Percent White 0.01 0.01 0.52 0.04 0.02 0.03 
Percent Free Lunch 0.02 0.02 0.46 0.05 0.03 0.09 
Percent AFDC 0.00 0.03 0.95 -0.03 0.04 0.43 
Percent Full Credential 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.92 
Predicted Residual Selection 0.22 0.07 0.00 0.46 0.08 0.00 
Constant -3.72 2.71 0.18 -0.09 3.37 0.98 
N 58 58 
R2 0.46 0.5 
Source: The California Department of Education's website:/lhttp: www.cde.ca.gov. 
Note: OLS regression is weighted by the number of students enrolled in each district. Percentile rankings 
are from Stanford 9 tests. 
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AppendixA. Heckman Selection Model Predicting 1999-1998 Gains in 
Reading and Math Test Scores in PUSD 
Reading Math 
Coefficient Standard P-value Coefficient Standard P-value 
Error Error 
Scores Model 
Bilingual LEP 1998 1.46 0.64 0.02 -0.41 0.68 0.55 
LEP 1998 0.75 0.34 0.03 0.72 0.40 0.07 
Hispanic 0.25 0.34 0.47 0.16 0.41 0.70 
Black -0.22 0.34 0.53 -0.07 0.41 0.87 
Other (Non-white) 1.26 0.54 0.02 2.09 0.65 0.00 
Male 0.01 0.21 0.97 -0.13 0.25 0.60 
Low SES 0.37 0.47 0.44 0.57 0.57 0.32 
Mid SES 0.40 0.46 0.38 -0.27 0.56 0.63 
AFDC -0.23 0.29 0.42 -0.47 0.34 0.17 
Free Lunch -0.12 0.27 0.65 -0.10 0.33 0.77 
Both Parents 0.10 0.37 0.79 0.65 0.45 0.15 
Mother 0.10 0.39 0.79 0.54 0.47 0.25 
Father 0.54 0.74 0.47 -0.75 0.89 0.40 
Percent Full Credentials -0.05 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.02 0.09 
Class Size -0.34 0.05 0.00 -0.20 0.05 0.00 
Magnet School 0.79 0.33 0.02 -0.01 0.38 0.98 
Constant 17.09 1.94 0.00 9.67 2.31 0.00 
Selection Model 
Bilingual LEP 1998 -0.98 0.05 0.00 -1.22 0.05 0.00 
LEP 1998 -0.14 0.04 0.00 -0.06 0.05 0.24 
Hispanic -0.30 0.04 0.00 -0.25 0.05 0.00 
Black -0.31 0.04 0.00 -0.25 0.05 0.00 
Percent Teacher Hispanic -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
Magnet 0.44 0.05 0.00 0.37 0.06 0.00 
Constant 1.31 0.06 0.00 1.41 0.07 0.00 
Rho -0.07 0.09 -0.08 0.06 
Lambda -0.79 1.00 -1.13 0.86 
N=13892 Wald ch2(25)=' N=13892 Wald ch2(25)=510 
Source: Student variables were provided by PUSD's Testing Department and school variables were 
obtained from the California Department of Education's website. 
Note: Dummy variables for each grade (excluding 11 th grade) were included in both the scores and selection 
equations, and all levels were significant. Scores from the Stanford 9 tests are on a scale from 1 to 99. 
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AppendixB. English Proficiency and Race Effects from Heckman Selection 
Model for Gains in 1999-1998 Reading and Math Test Scores of PUSD Students 
Reading Math 
Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-valuc 
Bilingual LEP 1998 1.1 <O.OS -1.01 >O.OS 
LEP 1998 0.69 <O.OS 0.68 >O.OS 
Hispanic 0.2 >O.S 0.12 >O.S 
Black 0.18 >0.2 -0.16 >O.S 
Source: See source note for Table 5. 
Note: The excluded variables are non-LEP and white. That is, bilingual LEPs gains in reading 
was 1.1 p larger than non-bilingual LEPs, and LEPS (bilingual and non-bilingual) gams was 
0.7 points less than non-LEPs. 
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Appendix C. 1998 Bilingual Enrollment Effect from Heckman Selection 
Model for PUSD Gains in 1999-1998 Reading and Math Test Scores, by Grade 
Reading Math 
1999 Grade Coefficient P-value 
Bilingual LEP 2nd Grade 
Bilingual LEP 3rd Grade 
Bilingual LEP 4th Grade 
Bilingual LEP 5th Grade 
Bilingual LEP 6th Grade 
Bilingual LEP 7th Grade 
Bilingual LEP 8th Grade 
2.50 
4.04 
1.80 
-0.30 
0.46 
0.97 
2.16 
Source: See source note for Table 5. 
>0.2 
<0.005 
>0.1 
<0.5 
>0.5 
>0.5 
>0.2 
Coefficient P-value 
3.89 >0.1 
3.84 <0.05 
-0.05 >0.5 
-2.78 <0.05 
-3.13 <0.05 
-0.87 >0.5 
1.35 >0.5 
Note: The excluded variables are non-LEP and white. That is, bilingual LEPs gains in reading 
was 1.1 p larger than non-bilingual LEPs, and LEPS (bilingual and non-bilingual) gams was 
0.7 points less than non-LEPs. 
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Chapter 6 Concl us ions 
\\'hat first prompted the present study \vas the passage of Proposition 227 in 1998, aimed at 
ending bilingual education in California. From a policy perspective, the initiative provided a 
unique opportunity to assess the efficacy of the controversial program of bilingual instruction. 
From a political point of \'iew, the initiative incited examination given that it was promoted 
by an openly conservative group while those mostly affected by the measure were mostly 
Hispanic students in California's public schools. But, what further triggered this research was 
the observation that this educational measure, aiming to dismantling bilingual instruction, 
provided for discretion at the school district level. \Vhy was discretion allowed? How did 
school districts implement the new mandate given discretion? Whose preferences, in the 
end, were represented in this educational reform'? 
The underlying theme in this dissertation has been representation. \Vhose preferences are 
being represented when we look at policy reform through the initiative process? Chapter 2 
begins by addressing this question from a formal perspective, looking at how the presence of 
multiple districts with their possibly diverse preferences impacts the types of propositions we 
observe. One of the key insights from the analysis is that voter heterogeneity of preferences 
or local bureaucracies having better information can induce discretion in the proposals. That 
is, the initiative group will propose an interval of policies rather than a single policy when 
districts' preferences and informational advantages encourage the group to do so. 
Normatively, discretion at the proposing stage can be a desirable aspect of the initiative 
process. l\Iany states, among them California, require strict majorities, or 50% of the votes, 
for passage of a state-wide initiative. Clearly, close to 50% of the voters can be made much 
worse by a successful initiative. However, under certain circumstances non-majority voters 
can be made better off when discretion is offered compared to when a single policy is offered. 
Consider, for example, two districts with strict opposite views on an issue and the initiative 
group with an ideal policy in the middle. \Vith discretion the initiative group offers an 
interval from the status quo of the majority district to its own ideal policy. If a single policy 
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is offered it will be just the majority district's status quo. In general, the minority district 
is better off when discretion is offered. Of course, in this setup the best alternative for both 
the majority and minority districts is to allow them full discretion. 
This brings us to the issue of the proper place for decision-making. The initiative process 
1S a state-level institution circumventing the state-legislative path and superseding local 
regulations. State-level policy making can be preferable to local-level policy-making when 
the policies in a district affect those of other districts. That is, externalities are present 
across districts. In the policy area of education, one can make a case that externalities are 
present. The physical and virtual interaction of citizens throughout the state seem to hint at 
the advantages of having similar standards of education. However, the same standards may 
be reached via different methods, and initiatives in education can deal with methodologies. 
Proposition 227 is an example of an educational initiative that, with the goal of promoting 
"English for the Children," in fact dealt with the methodology of providing English for the 
children. Normatively, deciding at the state-level on educational methodologies may give us 
some pause. 
Compared to other policy areas that are voted upon, educational initiatives dispropor-
tionally affect minorities since minority students are more likely to attend public schools. 
On the other hand, non-minority citizens are more likely to vote. In chapter 3, I explore 
how voters vote on educational initiatives in California. In general, I find that voting on 
educational initiatives is very similar to voting on other measures or voting on candidate 
elections, as might be expected. Ideology and race playa strong role on how people vote on 
educational measures. The fact that race matters as it does may give some hesitancy since, 
again, compared to other policy areas, educational initiatives significantly affect some racial 
groups more than others. Also, the fact that local school conditions did not seem to playa 
strong role on voter choice may not be desirable. 
After voter approval the final impact of the new educational policy gets determined by 
those who implement it. In chapter 4, I found that school districts implemented Proposition 
227 mostly along institutional and bureaucratic lines. Local politics and school conditions 
did not seem to matter, surprisingly considering how publicized and politically contentious 
this measure was. School districts seemed to have responded mostly to its own institutional 
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constraints rather than to external factors. 
\Nhat was the impact of Proposition 22T? In chapter 5, I find that, looking at one 
southern California school district, the effects were positive though small. Dismantling 
bilingual programs seems to he a policy move in the right direction though, incremental, 
considering the expectations. It is one of those paradoxes of policy and politics that a 
measure advocated by a conservative group, and unavoidably interpreted by many as having 
anti-minority undertones, would eventually benefit those minorities. 
The use of the initiative process for the reform of educational policies has mixed con-
sequences. At least in theory, discretion will often be given since voters seem to interpret 
educational reforms often from an ideological and racial perspective which in turn will often 
imply, especially in racially diverse states, heterogeneous preferences. Moreover, in educa-
tion research many important questions regarding the best ways of educating students from 
disadvantaged background remain wide open. Proposers should be encouraged then to offer 
some discretion to local institutions when they share a common goal. The arguably more 
puzzling aspects of reforming educational policies via the initiative process arc that school 
district bureaucracies do not seem to be responding to local voter's preferences and voters 
do not seem to be responding to local school conditions. 
